Related papers: On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria of Action-Gra…

Action-graph games (AGGs) are a fully expressive game representation which can compactly express both strict and context-specific independence between players' utility functions. Actions are represented as nodes in a graph G, and the payoff…

Computing Nash equilibrium in multi-agent games is a longstanding challenge at the interface of game theory and computer science. It is well known that a general normal form game in N players and k strategies requires exponential space…

We provide the first fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for computing an approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in tree-structured graphical multi-hypermatrix games (GMhGs). GMhGs are generalizations of normal-form…

This paper addresses the problem of fair equilibrium selection in graphical games. Our approach is based on the data structure called the {\em best response policy}, which was proposed by Kearns et al. \cite{kls} as a way to represent all…

We investigate complexity issues related to pure Nash equilibria of strategic games. We show that, even in very restrictive settings, determining whether a game has a pure Nash Equilibrium is NP-hard, while deciding whether a game has a…

We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, where the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy augmented by a fixed non-negative bonus for picking a given…

Synthesis of finite-state controllers from high-level specifications in multi-agent systems can be reduced to solving multi-player concurrent games over finite graphs. The complexity of solving such games with qualitative objectives for…

Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also have conceptual implications, for example for equilibrium…

The framework outlined in [arXiv:2010.13024] provides an approximation algorithm for computing Nash equilibria of normal form games. Since NASH is a well-known PPAD-complete problem, this framework has potential applications to other $PPAD$…

We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed non-negative integer bonus for picking a…

We study the problem of checking for the existence of constrained pure Nash equilibria in a subclass of polymatrix games defined on weighted directed graphs. The payoff of a player is defined as the sum of nonnegative rational weights on…

This paper studies the problem of Nash equilibrium approximation in large-scale heterogeneous mean-field games under communication and computation constraints. A deterministic mean-field game is considered in which the non-linear utility…

Equilibria of realistic multiplayer games constitute a key solution concept both in practical applications, such as online advertising auctions and electricity markets, and in analytical frameworks used to study strategic voting in…

We revisit the complexity of the well-studied notion of Additively Separable Hedonic Games (ASHGs). Such games model a basic clustering or coalition formation scenario in which selfish agents are represented by the vertices of an…

One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to predict agents' behaviour. To better understand the spread of various products through a social network arXiv:1105.2434 introduced a threshold model, in which the nodes…

We study the computational complexity of "public goods games on networks". In this model, each vertex in a graph is an agent that needs to take a binary decision of whether to "produce a good" or not. Each agent's utility depends on the…

We develop a quasi-polynomial time Las Vegas algorithm for approximating Nash equilibria in polymatrix games over trees, under a mild renormalizing assumption. Our result, in particular, leads to an expected polynomial-time algorithm for…

We consider the computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria in graphical games. It is known that the problem is NP-complete in general, but tractable (i.e., in P) for special classes of graphs such as those with bounded treewidth. It…

This paper is about computing constrained approximate Nash equilibria in polymatrix games, which are succinctly represented many-player games defined by an interaction graph between the players. In a recent breakthrough, Rubinstein showed…

This paper addresses a class of network games played by dynamic agents using their outputs. Unlike most existing related works, the Nash equilibrium in this work is defined by functions of agent outputs instead of full agent states, which…