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Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) in principle offers unconditional security based on the laws of physics. Continuous variable (CV) quantum key distribution has the potential for high-key-rate and low-cost implementations using standard…
Imperfect bit-and-basis encoders compromise the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems via modulation flaws, side channels and inter-pulse correlations, which invalidate standard security proofs. Existing results addressing such…
We show that a previously introduced key exchange based on a congruence-simple semiring action is not secure by providing an attack that reveals the shared key from the distributed public information for any of such semirings
Quantum metrology and quantum communications are typically considered as distinct applications in the broader portfolio of quantum technologies. However, there are cases where we might want to combine the two and recent proposals have shown…
All the currently available unconditional security proofs on quantum key distribution, in particular for the BB84 protocol and its variants including continuous-variable ones, are invalid or incomplete at many points. In this paper we…
Several fundamental issues in establishing security in continuous variable quantum key distribution are discussed, in particular on reverse reconciliation and security under heterodyne attack. It appears difficult to derive quantum…
Secure communication requires message authentication. In this paper we address the problem of how to authenticate quantum information sent through a quantum channel between two communicating parties with the minimum amount of resources.…
Quantum cryptography is reviewed, first using entanglement both for the intuition and for the experimental realizations. Next, the implementation is simplified in several steps until it becomes practical. At this point entanglement has…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the most explored application of quantum information theory. A central problem in entanglement-based QKD (EB-QKD), is whether every entangled state can be used to extract a key. We observe that entanglement…
Quantum cryptography exploits principles of quantum physics for the secure processing of information. A prominent example is secure communication, i.e., the task of transmitting confidential messages from one location to another. The…
Quantum key distribution can provide unconditionally secure key exchange for remote users in theory. In practice, however, in most quantum key distribution systems, quantum hackers might steal the secure keys by listening to the side…
In quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations, memory effects caused by the limited bandwidth of modulators and/or other active devices can leak information about previous setting choices. Security proofs addressing this imperfection…
We reply to a comment by Averin and Korotkov http://uk.arxiv.org/abs/cond-mat/0404549 on Stace and Barrett, PRL 92, 136802 (2004) http://link.aps.org/abstract/PRL/v92/e136802, showing that their specific criticisms are unfounded, and…
Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and…
We introduce the notion of trace-norm isometric encoding and explore its implications for passive and active methods to protect quantum information against errors. Beside providing an operational foundations to the "subsystems principle"…
Secure communication plays a crucial role in the Internet Age. Quantum mechanics may revolutionise cryptography as we know it today. In this Review Article, we introduce the motivation and the current state of the art of research in quantum…
Several quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols employ iterative sifting. After each quantum transmission round, Alice and Bob disclose part of their setting information (including their basis choices) for the detected signals. The quantum…
Kang et al. [Chin. Phys. B 24 (2015) 090306] proposed a controlled mutual quantum entity authentication protocol. We find that the proposed protocol is not secure, that is, Charlie can eavesdrop the shared keys between Alice and Bob without…
We review the current status of security proofs for practical decoy-state Quantum Key Distribution using the BB84 protocol, focusing on optical implementations with weak coherent pulses and threshold photodetectors. The primary aim of this…
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) is quantified by a parameter $\varepsilon>0$, which -- under well-defined physical assumptions -- can be bounded explicitly. This contrasts with computationally secure schemes, where security…