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In a recent note (arXiv:1209.2423) Renner claims that the criticisms of Hirota and Yuen on the security foundation of quantum key distribution arose from a logical mistake. In this paper it is shown that Renner misrepresents the claims of…

Quantum communications promise to revolutionise the way information is exchanged and protected. Unlike their classical counterpart, they are based on dim optical pulses that cannot be amplified by conventional optical repeaters.…

The quantum key distribution for multiparty is one of the essential subjects of study. Especially, without using entangled states, performing the quantum key distribution for multiparty is a critical area of research. For this purpose,…

As quantum key distribution becomes a mature technology, it appears clearly that some assumptions made in the security proofs cannot be justified in practical implementations. This might open the door to possible side-channel attacks. We…

Unconditionally secure message authentication is an important part of quantum cryptography (QC). In this correspondence, we analyze security effects of using a key obtained from QC for authentication purposes in later rounds of QC. In…

Quantum cryptography, quantum computer project, space-time quantization program and recent computer experiments reported by Accardi and his collaborators show the importance and actuality of the discussion of the completeness of quantum…

States with private correlations but little or no distillable entanglement were recently reported. Here, we consider the secure distribution of such states, i.e., the situation when an adversary gives two parties such states and they have…

We demonstrate that a necessary precondition for unconditionally secure quantum key distribution is that sender and receiver can use the available measurement results to prove the presence of entanglement in a quantum state that is…

Distributed-phase-reference quantum key distribution stands out for its easy implementation with present day technology. Since many years, a full security proof of these schemes in a realistic setting has been elusive. For the first time,…

In this article, we analyse the relationship between the Bell violation and the secure key rate of entanglement assisted quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols. Specifically, we address the question whether Bell violation is necessary or…

We show that a family of quantum authentication protocols introduced in [Barnum et al., FOCS 2002] can be used to construct a secure quantum channel and additionally recycle all of the secret key if the message is successfully…

We prove the security of quantum key distribution against the most general attacks which can be performed on the channel, by an eavesdropper who has unlimited computation abilities, and the full power allowed by the rules of classical and…

A quantum key distribution and identification protocol is proposed, which is based on entanglement swapping. Through choosing particles by twos from the sequence and performing Bell measurements, two communicators can detect eavesdropping,…

In quantum cryptography, the level of security attainable by a protocol which implements a particular task $N$ times bears no simple relation to the level of security attainable by a protocol implementing the task once. Useful partial…

This is a comment on recent paper by T.M. Stace and S.D. Barrett, PRL 92, 136802 (2004). We show that the main result of the paper, absence of the spectral peak for continuous weak measurement of coherent oscillations in a qubit, is…

This study proposes a quantum secret authentication code for protecting the integrity of secret quantum states. Since BB84[1] was first proposed, the eavesdropper detection strategy in almost all quantum cryptographic protocols is based on…

Lo and Ko in [1] have developed some attacks on the cryptosystem called AlphaEta [2], claiming that these attacks undermine the security of AlphaEta for both direct encryption and key generation. In this paper, we show that their arguments…

Most security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) assume that there is no unwanted information leakage about the state preparation process. However, this assumption is impossible to guarantee in practice, as QKD systems can leak…

Two recently published papers propose some very simple key distribution schemes designed to enable two or more parties to establish a shared secret key with the aid of a third party. Unfortunately, as we show, most of the schemes are…

Any Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol consists first of sequences of measurements that produce some correlation between classical data. We show that these correlation data must violate some Bell inequality in order to contain…