Free-Riding in Multi-Issue Decisions
Abstract
Voting in multi-issue domains allows for compromise outcomes that satisfy all voters to some extent, but such fairness considerations open the possibility of a special form of manipulation: free-riding, where voters untruthfully oppose a popular opinion in one issue to receive increased consideration in other issues; we study under which conditions this is possible and show that even weak fairness considerations enable free-riding, and through computational and experimental analysis, we find that while free-riding in multi-issue domains is often possible, it comes at a non-negligible individual risk for voters, making its allure smaller than one could intuitively assume.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2310.08194,
title = {Free-Riding in Multi-Issue Decisions},
author = {Martin Lackner and Jan Maly and Oliviero Nardi},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.08194},
year = {2025}
}
Comments
This is an extended version of the publication with the same name in the proceedings of AAMAS 2023