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Quantum key distribution (QKD) permits information-theoretically secure transmission of digital encryption keys, assuming that the behaviour of the devices employed for the key exchange can be reliably modelled and predicted. Remarkably, no…

The article is focused on research of an attack on the quantum key distribution system and proposes a countermeasure method. Particularly noteworthy is that this is not a classic attack on a quantum protocol. We describe an attack on the…

Quantum key distribution (QKD) has often been hailed as a reliable technology for secure communication in cyber-physical microgrids. Even though unauthorized key measurements are not possible in QKD, attempts to read them can disturb…

The fabrication of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems typically involves several parties, thus providing Eve with multiple opportunities to meddle with the devices. As a consequence, conventional hardware and/or software hacking attacks…

There has been much interest in quantum key distribution. Experimentally, quantum key distribution over 150 km of commercial Telecom fibers has been successfully performed. The crucial issue in quantum key distribution is its security.…

We prove the security of quantum key distribution against the most general attacks which can be performed on the channel, by an eavesdropper who has unlimited computation abilities, and the full power allowed by the rules of classical and…

In this Reply we propose a modified security proof of the Quantum Dense Key Distribution protocol detecting also the eavesdropping attack proposed by Wojcik in his Comment.

We introduce new sophisticated attacks with a Hong-Ou-Mandel interferometer against quantum key distribution (QKD) and propose a new QKD protocol grafted with random basis shuffling to block up those attacks. When the polarization basis is…

We investigate the performance of Gaussianmodulated coherent-state QKD protocols in the presence of canonical attacks, which are collective Gaussian attacks resulting in Gaussian channels described by one of the possible canonical forms. We…

We assess the security of a quantum key distribution protocol relying on the transmission of Gaussian-modulated coherent states and homodyne detection. This protocol is shown to be equivalent to a squeezed state protocol based on a CSS code…

Due to its ability to tolerate high channel loss, decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) has been one of the main focuses within the QKD community. Notably, several experimental groups have demonstrated that it is secure and feasible…

Security of an ideal system for quantum key distribution can be formally proved. However, technological imperfections of real systems can be misused by an eavesdropper to get information about the key without causing a detectable change in…

Employing the fundamental laws of quantum physics, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) promises the unconditionally secure distribution of cryptographic keys. However, in practical realisations, a QKD protocol is only secure, when the quantum…

We prove the security of theoretical quantum key distribution against the most general attacks which can be performed on the channel, by an eavesdropper who has unlimited computation abilities, and the full power allowed by the rules of…

We examine a situation that $n$ eavesdroppers attack the Bennett-Brassard cryptographic protocol via their own optimal and symmetric strategies. Information gain and mutual information with sender for each eavesdropper are explicitly…

We identify and study a new security loophole in continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) implementations, related to the imperfect linearity of the homodyne detector. By exploiting this loophole, we propose an active…

A continuous key distribution scheme is proposed that relies on a pair of canonically conjugate quantum variables. It allows two remote parties to share a secret Gaussian key by encoding it into one of the two quadrature components of a…

Recently, Zhang, Li, and Guo have proposed a particular eavesdropping attack [Phys. Rev. A {\bf 63}, 036301 (2001), quant-ph/0009042] which shows that my quantum key distribution protocol based on entanglement swapping [Phys. Rev. A {\bf…

We introduce a general approach for the analysis of a quantum direct communication protocol. The method is based on the investigation of the superoperator acting on a joint system of the communicating parties and the eavesdropper. The…

The disturbance effect of a depolarizing channel on the security of the quantum key distribution of the four state BB84 protocol with multiple sequentiel intercept and resend attacks of many eavesdroppers, has been studied. The quantum bit…