相关论文: Trojan Horse attacks on Quantum Key Distribution s…

This report investigates the potential impact of a Trojan attack on power conversion circuits, specifically a switching signal attack designed to trigger a locking of the pulse width modulation (PWM) signal that goes to a power field-effect…

A particularly successful detector blinding attack has been recently demonstrated on various quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, performing for the first time an undetectable and complete recovery of the key. In this paper two original…

Machine learning (ML) models that use deep neural networks are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Such attacks involve the insertion of a (hidden) trigger by an adversary. As a consequence, any input that contains the trigger will cause the…

We present strong attacks against quantum key distribution schemes which use quantum memories and quantum gates to attack directly the final key. We analyze a specific attack of this type, for which we find the density matrices available to…

To protect practical quantum key distribution (QKD) against photon-number-splitting attacks, one could measure the coherence of the received signals. One prominent example that follows this approach is coherent-one-way (COW) QKD, which is…

We demonstrate the experimental feasibility of a Trojan-horse attack that remains nearly invisible to the single-photon detectors employed in practical quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, such as Clavis2 from ID Quantique. We perform a…

Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proved to be information-theoretically secure in theory. Unfortunately, the imperfect devices in practice compromise its security. Thus, to improve the security property of practical QKD systems, a…

Controlling the energy of unauthorized light signals in a quantum cryptosystem is an essential criterion for implementation security. Here, we propose a passive optical power limiter device based on thermo-optical defocusing effects…

Not long ago, it was thought that only software applications and general purpose digital systems i.e. computers were prone to various types of attacks against their security. The underlying hardware, hardware implementations of these…

Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and…

The emergence of quantum computing poses significant risks to the security of modern communication networks as it breaks today's public-key cryptographic algorithms. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers a promising solution by harnessing…

Most currently used cryptographic tools for protecting data are based on certain computational assumptions, which makes them vulnerable with respect to technological and algorithmic developments, such as quantum computing. One existing…

We present a method to control the detection events in quantum key distribution systems that use gated single-photon detectors. We employ bright pulses as faked states, timed to arrive at the avalanche photodiodes outside the activation…

Quantum key distribution (QKD) can be used to generate secret keys between two distant parties. Even though QKD has been proven unconditionally secure against eavesdroppers with unlimited computation power, practical implementations of QKD…

We analyzed the security of the multiparty quantum secret sharing (MQSS) protocol recently proposed by Zhang, Li and Man [Phys. Rev. A \textbf{71}, 044301 (2005)] and found that this protocol is secure for any other eavesdropper except for…

In this paper we present the quantum control attack on quantum key distribution systems. The cornerstone of the attack is that Eve can use unitary (polar) decomposition of her positive-operator valued measure elements, which allows her to…

Quantum cryptography promises security based on the laws of physics with proofs of security against attackers of unlimited computational power. However, deviations from the original assumptions allow quantum hackers to compromise the…

The development of quantum computers has been advancing rapidly in recent years. As quantum computers become more widely accessible, potentially malicious users could try to execute their code on the machines to leak information from other…

Due to the exiting semi-quantum secret sharing protocol have two challenges including (1) the dealer must be the quantum user, and (2) the classical users must equip with the Trojan Horse detectors, this study wants to propose a novel…

In this paper, security of practically decoy state quantum key distribution under fake state attack is considered. If quantum key distribution is insecure under this type of attack, decoy sources can not also provide it with enough…