相关论文: Information vs. Disturbance in Dimension D
It has been shown that Information-Disturbance theorem can play an important role in security proof of quantum cryptography. The theorem is by itself interesting since it can be regarded as an information theoretic version of uncertainty…
We derive a novel version of information-disturbance theorems for mutually unbiased observables. We show that the information gain by Eve inevitably makes the outcomes by Bob in the conjugate basis not only erroneous but random.
Eavesdropping attacks in inference systems aim to learn not the raw data, but the system inferences to predict and manipulate system actions. We argue that conventional information security measures can be ambiguous on the adversary's…
In this Paper, we investigate the security of Zhang, Li and Guo quantum key distribution via quantum encryption protocol [$\text{Phys. Rev. A} \textbf{64}, 24302 (2001)$] and show that it is not secure against some of Eve's attacks and with…
All incoherent as well as 2- and 3-qubit coherent eavesdropping strategies on the 6 state protocol of quantum cryptography are classified. For a disturbance of 1/6, the optimal incoherent eavesdropping strategy reduces to the universal…
Information-theoretically secure communications are possible when channel noise is usable and when the channel has an intrinsic characteristic that a legitimate receiver (Bob) can use the noise more advantageously than an eavesdropper…
Alice communicates with words drawn uniformly amongst $\{\ket{j}\}_{j=1..n}$, the canonical orthonormal basis. Sometimes however Alice interleaves quantum decoys $\{\frac{\ket{j}+i\ket{k}}{\sqrt{2}}\}$ between her messages. Such pairwise…
It is shown that if the wave function of a quantum system undergoes an arbitrary random transformation such that the diagonal elements of the density matrix in the decoherence basis associated with a preferred observable remain constant,…
A variety of methods have been proposed to try to explain how deep neural networks make their decisions. Key to those approaches is the need to sample the pixel space efficiently in order to derive importance maps. However, it has been…
In a realistic situation, it is very difficult to communicate securely between two distant parties without introducing any disturbances. These disturbances might occur either due to external noise or may be due to the interference of an…
In quantum key distribution, one conservatively assumes that the eavesdropper Eve is restricted only by physical laws, whereas the legitimate parties, namely the sender Alice and receiver Bob, are subject to realistic constraints, such as…
This paper suggests an improvement to the BB84 scheme in Quantum key distribution. The original scheme has its weakness in letting quantifiably more information gain to an eavesdropper during public announcement of unencrypted bases lists.…
The "semiquantum" key distribution protocol introduced by Zou et al. [Phys. Rev. A Vol.79, 052312 (2009)] is examined. The protocol while using two-way quantum communication requires only Bob to be fully quantum. We derive a trade-off…
We demonstrate that secure quantum key distribution systems based on continuous variables implementations can operate beyond the apparent 3 dB loss limit that is implied by the beam splitting attack . The loss limit was established for…
We study a general quantum key distribution protocol in higher dimension. In this protocol, quantum states in arbitrary $g+1$ ($1\le g\le d$) out of all $d+1$ mutually unbiased bases in a d-dimensional system can be used for the key…
Using the generalized Bell states and controlled not gates, we introduce an enatanglement-based quantum key distribution (QKD) of d-level states (qudits). In case of eavesdropping, Eve's information gain is zero and a quantum error rate of…
The engine that powers quantum cryptography is the principle that there are no physical means for gathering information about the identity of a quantum system's state (when it is known to be prepared in one of a set of nonorthogonal states)…
The engine that powers quantum cryptography is the principle that there are no physical means for gathering information about the identity of a quantum system's state (when it is known to be prepared in one of a set of nonorthogonal states)…
Alice wants to send an arbitrary binary word to Bob. We show here that there is no problem for her to do that with only two bits. Of course, we consider here information like a signal in 4D.
In usual security proofs of quantum protocols the adversary (Eve) is expected to have full control over any quantum communication between any communicating parties (Alice and Bob). Eve is also expected to have full access to an…