相关论文: The 'quantum dialogue' can be eavesdropped under t…
In 2004, Ba An Nguyen [Phys. Lett. A 328, 6-10] has presented a Quantum Dialogue scheme for simultaneously communicating their messages. In this comment, we show that the quantum dialogue scheme is not secure against the…
We propose an entanglement-based protocol for two people to simultaneously exchange their messages. We show that the protocol is asymptotically secure against the disturbance attack, the intercept-and-resend attack and the…
We present a quantum dialogue protocol by using the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state. In this paper, we point out that the `quantum dialogue' communication scheme recently introduced by Nguyen can be eavesdropped on under an…
From the perspective of information theory and cryptography, we analyze the security of two quantum dialogue protocols and a bidirectional quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) protocol, and point out that the transmitted information…
In this Reply we propose a modified security proof of the Quantum Dense Key Distribution protocol detecting also the eavesdropping attack proposed by Wojcik in his Comment.
A quantum protocol is described which enables a user to send sealed messages and that allows for the detection of active eavesdroppers. We examine a class of eavesdropping strategies, those that make use of quantum operations, and we…
Gao et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 101, 208901 (2008)] have described a possible intercept-resend attack for the quantum protocol for detectable Byzantine agreement in Phys. Rev. Lett. 100, 070504 (2008). Here we describe an extension of the…
Quantum communication, particularly quantum key distribution, is poised to play a pivotal role in our communication system in the near future. Consequently, it is imperative to not only assess the vulnerability of quantum communication to…
The security of quantum exam [Phys. Lett. A 350 (2006) 174] is analyzed and it is found that this protocol is secure for any eavesdropper except for the "students" who take part in the exam. Specifically, any student can steal other…
The security of quantum key distribution relies on the validity of quantum mechanics as a description of nature and on the non-existence of leaky degrees of freedom in the practical implementations. We experimentally demonstrate how, in…
If an eavesdropper succeeds in compromising the quantum as well as the classical channels and mimics the receiver "Bob" for the sender "Alice" and vice versa, one defence strategy is the successive, temporally interlocked partial…
Recently, Chou et al. [Electron Commer Res, DOI 10.1007/s10660-014-9143-6] presented a novel controlled quantum secure direct communication protocol which can be used for online shopping. The authors claimed that their protocol was immune…
Recently, Zhang, Li, and Guo have proposed a particular eavesdropping attack [Phys. Rev. A {\bf 63}, 036301 (2001), quant-ph/0009042] which shows that my quantum key distribution protocol based on entanglement swapping [Phys. Rev. A {\bf…
Two protocols of quantum direct communication with authentication [Phys. Rev. A {\bf 73}, 042305 (2006)] are recently proposed by Lee, Lim and Yang. In this paper we will show that in the two protocols the authenticator Trent should be…
An intercept-resend attack on a continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution protocol is investigated experimentally. By varying the interception fraction, one can implement a family of attacks where the eavesdropper totally controls the…
We study the problem of joint communication and detection of wiretapping on an optical fiber from a quantum perspective. Our system model describes a communication link that is capable of transmitting data under normal operating conditions…
We prove the security of quantum key distribution against the most general attacks which can be performed on the channel, by an eavesdropper who has unlimited computation abilities, and the full power allowed by the rules of classical and…
The proposed eavesdropping scheme reveals that the quantum communication protocol recently presented by Bostrom and Felbinger [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)] is not secure as far as quantum channel losses are taken into account.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables secure key sharing between distant parties, with several protocols proven resilient against conventional eavesdropping strategies. Here, we introduce a new attack scenario where an eavesdropper, Eve,…
In this paper we present the quantum control attack on quantum key distribution systems. The cornerstone of the attack is that Eve can use unitary (polar) decomposition of her positive-operator valued measure elements, which allows her to…