相关论文: Attacks on Symmetric Quantum Coin-Tossing Protocol…

In this article we present a general security strategy for quantum secret sharing (QSS) protocols based on the HBB scheme presented by Hillery, Bu\v{z}ek and Berthiaume [Phys. Rev A \textbf{59}, 1829 (1999)]. We focus on a generalization of…

Unconditional security of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol has been proved by exploiting the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics, but the practical quantum key distribution system maybe hacked by considering the imperfect state…

Quantum computers, that may become available one day, would impact many scientific fields, most notably cryptography since many asymmetric primitives are insecure against an adversary with quantum capabilities. Cryptographers are already…

We analyzed the security of the multiparty quantum secret sharing (MQSS) protocol recently proposed by Zhang, Li and Man [Phys. Rev. A \textbf{71}, 044301 (2005)] and found that this protocol is secure for any other eavesdropper except for…

The security issues facing quantum key distribution (QKD) are explained, herein focusing on those issues that are cryptographic and information theoretic in nature and not those based on physics. The problem of security criteria is…

There is no doubt that quantum key distribution is an excellent result as a science. However, this paper presents a view on quantum key distribution (QKD) wherein QKD may have a difficulty to provide a sufficient security and good…

The security of the previous quantum key distribution protocols, which is guaranteed by the nature of physics law, is based on the legitimate users. However, the impersonation of Alice or Bob by eavesdropper, in practice. will be existed in…

Quantum cryptography uses techniques and ideas from physics and computer science. The combination of these ideas makes the security proofs of quantum cryptography a complicated task. To prove that a quantum-cryptography protocol is secure,…

We investigate the performance of Gaussianmodulated coherent-state QKD protocols in the presence of canonical attacks, which are collective Gaussian attacks resulting in Gaussian channels described by one of the possible canonical forms. We…

Based on quantum encryption, we present a new idea for quantum public-key cryptography (QPKC) and construct a whole theoretical framework of a QPKC system. We show that the quantum-mechanical nature renders it feasible and reasonable to use…

We propose an entanglement-based protocol for two people to simultaneously exchange their messages. We show that the protocol is asymptotically secure against the disturbance attack, the intercept-and-resend attack and the…

Quantum communication protocols can be designed to detect eavesdropping attacks, something that classical technologies are unable to do since classical information can be replicated in a non-destructive manner. Eavesdropping detection is,…

Recent results of Kaplan et al., building on previous work by Kuwakado and Morii, have shown that a wide variety of classically-secure symmetric-key cryptosystems can be completely broken by quantum chosen-plaintext attacks (qCPA). In such…

In a recent comment \cite{ch1} it has been claimed that an entangled-based quantum key distribution protocol proposed in \cite{zhang} and its generalization to d-level systems in \cite{v1} are insecure against an attack devised by the…

We propose a way to retrieve the secure key generated by the coherent one way protocol without reading the information transmitted on the quantum channel.

We propose a chosen-ciphertext attack on recently presented noncommutative variant of the well-known Polly Cracker cryptosystem. We show that if one chooses parameters for this noncommutative Polly Cracker as initially proposed, than the…

We present a continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol combining a continuous but slightly non-Gaussian modulation together with a efficient reverse reconciliation scheme. We establish the security of this protocol against…

Secure key distribution among two remote parties is impossible when both are classical, unless some unproven (and arguably unrealistic) computation-complexity assumptions are made, such as the difficulty of factorizing large numbers. On the…

In this article I present a protocol for quantum cryptography which is secure against attacks on individual signals. It is based on the Bennett-Brassard protocol of 1984 (BB84). The security proof is complete as far as the use of single…

The Sending-or-Not-Sending protocol of the twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) has its advantage of unconditional security proof under any coherent attack and fault tolerance to large misalignment error. So far this is the only…