相关论文: Universal Learning of Repeated Matrix Games

We propose a multi-agent distributed reinforcement learning algorithm that balances between potentially conflicting short-term reward and sparse, delayed long-term reward, and learns with partial information in a dynamic environment. We…

Continual learning is an online paradigm where a learner continually accumulates knowledge from different tasks encountered over sequential time steps. Importantly, the learner is required to extend and update its knowledge without…

We study best-response type learning dynamics for zero-sum polymatrix games under two information settings. The two settings are distinguished by the type of information that each player has about the game and their opponents' strategy. The…

When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…

A learning algorithm based on primary school teaching and learning is presented. The methodology is to continuously evaluate a student and to give them training on the examples for which they repeatedly fail, until, they can correctly…

We study a version of the classical zero-sum matrix game with unknown payoff matrix and bandit feedback, where the players only observe each others actions and a noisy payoff. This generalizes the usual matrix game, where the payoff matrix…

Using methods from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems we analyze the properties of bimatrix games with random payoffs in the limit where the number of pure strategies of each player tends to infinity. We analytically calculate…

A common approach to learn robotic skills is to imitate a demonstrated policy. Due to the compounding of small errors and perturbations, this approach may let the robot leave the states in which the demonstrations were provided. This…

Do boundedly rational players learn to choose equilibrium strategies as they play a game repeatedly? A large literature in behavioral game theory has proposed and experimentally tested various learning algorithms, but a comparative analysis…

We consider the problem of predicting human players' actions in repeated strategic interactions. Our goal is to predict the dynamic step-by-step behavior of individual players in previously unseen games. We study the ability of neural…

Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…

We study the problem of characterizing optimal learning algorithms for playing repeated games against an adversary with unknown payoffs. In this problem, the first player (called the learner) commits to a learning algorithm against a second…

A comprehensive artificial intelligence system needs to not only perceive the environment with different `senses' (e.g., seeing and hearing) but also infer the world's conditional (or even causal) relations and corresponding uncertainty.…

We explore a collaborative and cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning setting where a team of reinforcement learning agents attempt to solve a single cooperative task in a multi-scenario setting. We propose a novel multi-agent…

We study the problem of learning an unknown function using random feature models. Our main contribution is an exact asymptotic analysis of such learning problems with Gaussian data. Under mild regularity conditions for the feature matrix,…

The main focus of this paper is on enhancement of two types of game-theoretic learning algorithms: log-linear learning and reinforcement learning. The standard analysis of log-linear learning needs a highly structured environment, i.e.…

Evolutionary spatial 2 x 2 games between heterogeneous agents are analyzed using different variants of cellular automata (CA). Agents play repeatedly against their nearest neighbors 2 x 2 games specified by a rescaled payoff matrix with two…

We study two-player general sum repeated finite games where the rewards of each player are generated from an unknown distribution. Our aim is to find the egalitarian bargaining solution (EBS) for the repeated game, which can lead to much…

We consider the problem of prediction by a machine learning algorithm, called learner, within an adversarial learning setting. The learner's task is to correctly predict the class of data passed to it as a query. However, along with queries…

Many learning algorithms are known to converge to an equilibrium for specific classes of games if the same learning algorithm is adopted by all agents. However, when the agents are self-interested, a natural question is whether agents have…