相关论文: Two Representations for Iterative Non-prioritized …

This paper deals with the revision of partially ordered beliefs. It proposes a semantic representation of epistemic states by partial pre-orders on interpretations and a syntactic representation by partially ordered belief bases. Two…

Iterated belief revision requires information about the current beliefs. This information is represented by mathematical structures called doxastic states. Most literature concentrates on how to revise a doxastic state and neglects that it…

AGM's belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the study of belief change operations. In this context, belief bases (prioritised bases) have been primarily used to specify the agent's belief state. While the connection of iterated…

AGM's belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the study of belief change operations. In this context, belief bases (prioritised bases) have been largely used to specify the agent's belief state - whether representing the agent's…

In this contribution we explore choice revision, a sort of belief change in which the new information is represented by a set of sentences and the agent could accept some of the sentences while rejecting the others. We propose a generalized…

We consider the two-fold problem of representing collective beliefs and aggregating these beliefs. We propose modular, transitive relations for collective beliefs. They allow us to represent conflicting opinions and they have a clear…

We examine carefully the rationale underlying the approaches to belief change taken in the literature, and highlight what we view as methodological problems. We argue that to study belief change carefully, we must be quite explicit about…

Epistemic uncertainty in neural networks is commonly modeled using two second-order paradigms: distribution-based representations, which rely on posterior parameter distributions, and set-based representations based on credal sets (convex…

In this paper we introduce a nonmonotonic framework for belief revision in which reasoning about the reliability of different pieces of information based on meta-knowledge about the information is possible, and where revision strategies can…

Traditional approaches to non-monotonic reasoning fail to satisfy a number of plausible axioms for belief revision and suffer from conceptual difficulties as well. Recent work on ranked preferential models (RPMs) promises to overcome some…

Default logic can be regarded as a mechanism to represent families of belief sets of a reasoning agent. As such, it is inherently second-order. In this paper, we study the problem of representability of a family of theories as the set of…

Non-deductive reasoning systems are often {\em representation dependent}: representing the same situation in two different ways may cause such a system to return two different answers. Some have viewed this as a significant problem. For…

Choice revision is a sort of non-prioritized multiple revision, in which the agent partially accepts the new information represented by a set of sentences. We investigate the construction of choice revision based on a new approach to belief…

The (extended) AGM postulates for belief revision seem to deal with the revision of a given theory K by an arbitrary formula, but not to constrain the revisions of two different theories by the same formula. A new postulate is proposed and…

In the field of knowledge representation, the considered epistemic states are often based on propositional interpretations, also called worlds. E.g., epistemic states of agents can be modelled by ranking functions or total preorders on…

Belief revision has been studied mainly with respect to background logics that are monotonic in character. In this paper we study belief revision when the underlying logic is non-monotonic instead--an inherently interesting problem that is…

The importance of transformations and normal forms in logic programming, and generally in computer science, is well documented. This paper investigates transformations and normal forms in the context of Defeasible Logic, a simple but…

Recursive reasoning systems alternate between acquiring new evidence and refining an accumulated understanding. Two design choices are typically left implicit: how to represent the evolving reasoning state, and when to stop iterating. This…

The notion of argumentation and the one of belief stand in a problematic relation to one another. On the one hand, argumentation is crucial for belief formation: as the outcome of a process of arguing, an agent might come to (justifiably)…

In most classical models of belief change, epistemic states are represented by theories (AGM) or formulas (Katsuno-Mendelzon) and the new pieces of information by formulas. The Representation Theorem for revision operators says that…