相关论文: Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofnes…

We study the election control problem with multi-votes, where each voter can present a single vote according different views (or layers, we use "layer" to represent "view"). For example, according to the attributes of candidates, such as:…

We consider an agent community wishing to decide on several binary issues by means of issue-by-issue majority voting. For each issue and each agent, one of the two options is better than the other. However, some of the agents may be…

We introduce and study the weakly single-crossing domain on trees which is a generalization of the well-studied single-crossing domain in social choice theory. We design a polynomial-time algorithm for recognizing preference profiles which…

Voting theory has become increasingly integrated with computational social choice and multiagent systems. Computational complexity has been extensively used as a shield against manipulation of voting systems, however for several voting…

In many real world situations, collective decisions are made using voting. Moreover, scenarios such as committee or board elections require voting rules that return multiple winners. In multi-winner approval voting (AV), an agent may vote…

It is important to collect credible training samples $(x,y)$ for building data-intensive learning systems (e.g., a deep learning system). Asking people to report complex distribution $p(x)$, though theoretically viable, is challenging in…

The Possible-Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters' preferences over the set of candidates is partially specified, whether a distinguished candidate can become a winner. In this work, we consider the computational…

In the computational social choice literature, there has been great interest in understanding how computational complexity can act as a barrier against manipulation of elections. Much of this literature, however, makes the assumption that…

AI agents are commonly trained with large datasets of demonstrations of human behavior. However, not all behaviors are equally safe or desirable. Desired characteristics for an AI agent can be expressed by assigning desirability scores,…

We introduce and study a computational version of the principal-agent problem -- a classic problem in Economics that arises when a principal desires to contract an agent to carry out some task, but has incomplete information about the agent…

Single-peakedness is one of the most important and well-known domain restrictions on preferences. The computational study of single-peaked electorates has largely been restricted to elections with tie-free votes, and recent work that…

In peer selection agents must choose a subset of themselves for an award or a prize. As agents are self-interested, we want to design algorithms that are impartial, so that an individual agent cannot affect their own chance of being…

Given a learning problem with real-world tradeoffs, which cost function should the model be trained to optimize? This is the metric selection problem in machine learning. Despite its practical interest, there is limited formal guidance on…

We propose models for lobbying in a probabilistic environment, in which an actor (called "The Lobby") seeks to influence voters' preferences of voting for or against multiple issues when the voters' preferences are represented in terms of…

Preference queries incorporate the notion of binary preference relation into relational database querying. Instead of returning all the answers, such queries return only the best answers, according to a given preference relation. Preference…

A key distinguishing feature of conversational recommender systems over traditional recommender systems is their ability to elicit user preferences using natural language. Currently, the predominant approach to preference elicitation is to…

Recent advances in multi-task peer prediction have greatly expanded our knowledge about the power of multi-task peer prediction mechanisms. Various mechanisms have been proposed in different settings to elicit different types of…

We extend Approval voting to the settings where voters may have intransitive preferences. The major obstacle to applying Approval voting in these settings is that voters are not able to clearly determine who they should approve or…

Formal verification of multi-agent systems is hard, both theoretically and in practice. In particular, studies that use a single verification technique typically show limited efficiency, and allow to verify only toy examples. Here, we…

Many electoral bribery, control, and manipulation problems (which we will refer to in general as "manipulative actions" problems) are NP-hard in the general case. It has recently been noted that many of these problems fall into polynomial…