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Formal verification is a critical process in ensuring the security and correctness of cryptographic protocols, particularly in high-assurance domains. This paper presents a comprehensive formal analysis of the Permission Voucher Protocol, a…

Automated security protocol verifiers such as ProVerif and Tamarin have been increasingly applied to verify large scale complex real-world protocols. While their ability to automate difficult reasoning processes required to handle protocols…

We provide a framework consisting of tools and metatheorems for the end-to-end verification of security protocols, which bridges the gap between automated protocol verification and code-level proofs. We automatically translate a Tamarin…

Automated verification of security protocols based on dynamic root of trust, typically relying on protected hardware such as TPM, involves several challenges that we address in this paper. We model the semantics of trusted computing…

Cryptographic protocols play a fundamental role in securing modern digital infrastructure, but they are often deployed without prior formal verification. This could lead to the adoption of distributed systems vulnerable to attack vectors.…

Formal verification is crucial for ensuring the robustness of security protocols against adversarial attacks. The Needham-Schroeder protocol, a foundational authentication mechanism, has been extensively studied, including its integration…

Security of cryptographic protocols can be analysed by creating a model in a formal language and verifying the model in a tool. All such tools focus on the last part of the analysis, verification, and the interpretation of the specification…

Transparency protocols are protocols whose actions can be publicly monitored by observers (such observers may include regulators, rights advocacy groups, or the general public). The observed actions are typically usages of private keys such…

In today's world, critical infrastructure is often controlled by computing systems. This introduces new risks for cyber attacks, which can compromise the security and disrupt the functionality of these systems. It is therefore necessary to…

ProVerif is a widely used security protocol verifier. Internally, ProVerif uses an abstract representation of the protocol by Horn clauses and a resolution algorithm on these clauses, in order to prove security properties of the protocol or…

Single Sign-On (SSO) protocols streamline user authentication with a unified login for multiple online services, improving usability and security. One of the most common SSO protocol frameworks - the Security Assertion Markup Language V2.0…

Little can be achieved in the design of security protocols without trusting at least some participants. This trust should be justified or, at the very least, subject to examination. One way to strengthen trustworthiness is to hold parties…

As software becomes more complex and assumes an even greater role in our lives, formal verification is set to become the gold standard in securing software systems into the future, since it can guarantee the absence of errors and entire…

We propose a methodology for verifying security properties of network protocols at design level. It can be separated in two main parts: context and requirements analysis and informal verification; and formal representation and procedural…

There exists a verification gap between formal protocol specifications and their actual implementations, which this work aims to bridge via monitoring for compliance to the formal specification. We instrument the networking and…

Security must be considered in almost every software system. Unfortunately, selecting and implementing security features remains challenging due to the variety of security threats and possible countermeasures. While security standards are…

This thesis presents an automated method for verifying security properties of protocol implementations written in the C language. We assume that each successful run of a protocol follows the same path through the C code, justified by the…

Diffie-Hellman groups are commonly used in cryptographic protocols. While most state-of-the-art, symbolic protocol verifiers support them to some degree, they do not support all mathematical operations possible in these groups. In…

Aggregate signatures are digital signatures that compress multiple signatures from different parties into a single signature, thereby reducing storage and bandwidth requirements. BLS aggregate signatures are a popular kind of aggregate…

In this paper, we consider the problem of verifying anonymity and unlinkability in the symbolic model, where protocols are represented as processes in a variant of the applied pi calculus, notably used in the ProVerif tool. Existing tools…