相关论文: One Step to the Side: Why Defenses Against Malicio…
Reliable evaluation of adversarial defenses is a challenging task, currently limited to an expert who manually crafts attacks that exploit the defense's inner workings or approaches based on an ensemble of fixed attacks, none of which may…
Adaptive attacks have (rightfully) become the de facto standard for evaluating defenses to adversarial examples. We find, however, that typical adaptive evaluations are incomplete. We demonstrate that thirteen defenses recently published at…
LLM developers have imposed technical interventions to prevent fine-tuning misuse attacks, attacks where adversaries evade safeguards by fine-tuning the model using a public API. Previous work has established several successful attacks…
Correctly evaluating defenses against adversarial examples has proven to be extremely difficult. Despite the significant amount of recent work attempting to design defenses that withstand adaptive attacks, few have succeeded; most papers…
The safety and robustness of learning-based decision-making systems are under threats from adversarial examples, as imperceptible perturbations can mislead neural networks to completely different outputs. In this paper, we present an…
Recent research demonstrates that the nascent fine-tuning-as-a-service business model exposes serious safety concerns: fine-tuning with a few harmful data uploaded from the users can compromise the safety alignment of the model. The attack,…
Machine-learning models demand periodic updates to improve their average accuracy, exploiting novel architectures and additional data. However, a newly updated model may commit mistakes the previous model did not make. Such…
Hundreds of defenses have been proposed to make deep neural networks robust against minimal (adversarial) input perturbations. However, only a handful of these defenses held up their claims because correctly evaluating robustness is…
Adversarial attacks present a significant security risk to image recognition tasks. Defending against these attacks in a real-life setting can be compared to the way antivirus software works, with a key consideration being how well the…
AI systems are rapidly advancing in capability, and frontier model developers broadly acknowledge the need for safeguards against serious misuse. However, this paper demonstrates that fine-tuning, whether via open weights or closed…
As a new programming paradigm, deep learning has expanded its application to many real-world problems. At the same time, deep learning based software are found to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Though various defense mechanisms have…
Black-box finetuning is an emerging interface for adapting state-of-the-art language models to user needs. However, such access may also let malicious actors undermine model safety. To demonstrate the challenge of defending finetuning…
Background: Fine-tuning is central to adapting pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) to downstream tasks, but its reliance on training data, parameter updates, and reusable components opens entry points for attackers. Threats have…
The performance of deep models, including Vision Transformers, is known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Many existing defenses against these attacks, such as adversarial training, rely on full-model fine-tuning to induce robustness…
Self-adaptive systems offer several attack surfaces due to the communication via different channels and the different sensors required to observe the environment. Often, attacks cause safety to be compromised as well, making it necessary to…
Model fingerprinting has emerged as a promising paradigm for claiming model ownership. However, robustness evaluations of these schemes have mostly focused on benign perturbations such as incremental fine-tuning, model merging, and…
Adaptive defenses, which optimize at test time, promise to improve adversarial robustness. We categorize such adaptive test-time defenses, explain their potential benefits and drawbacks, and evaluate a representative variety of the latest…
Current research on defending against adversarial examples focuses primarily on achieving robustness against a single attack type such as $\ell_2$ or $\ell_{\infty}$-bounded attacks. However, the space of possible perturbations is much…
Robust training methods typically defend against specific attack types, such as Lp attacks with fixed budgets, and rarely account for the fact that defenders may encounter new attacks over time. A natural solution is to adapt the defended…
Progress in making neural networks more robust against adversarial attacks is mostly marginal, despite the great efforts of the research community. Moreover, the robustness evaluation is often imprecise, making it difficult to identify…