相关论文: Sleeper Channels and Provenance Gates: Persistent …
The rapid evolution of large language model (LLM)-driven autonomous agents has given rise to OpenClaw, a new class of open-source agent frameworks that operate as continuously running, skill-augmented systems with persistent memory,…
AI agent frameworks connecting large language model (LLM) reasoning to host execution surfaces -- shell, filesystem, containers, and messaging -- introduce security challenges structurally distinct from conventional software. We present a…
An agentic-AI runtime issues tool calls, sends messages, and actuates devices on behalf of an LLM. Catching the four ways an action can diverge from its audit record -- F1 gate-bypass, F2 audit-forgery, silent host failure, F4 wrong-target,…
Autonomous agent frameworks built upon large language models (LLMs) are evolving into complex, tool-integrated, and continuously operating systems, introducing security risks beyond traditional prompt-level vulnerabilities. As this paradigm…
AI agents are entering high-risk production settings, where they use tools, retain context, follow policies, handle private data, and interact with users over multiple turns. Yet many evaluation methods still judge isolated outputs or…
Autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, exemplified by OpenClaw, demonstrate remarkable capabilities in executing complex, long-horizon tasks. However, their tightly coupled instant-messaging interaction paradigm and high-privilege…
Personal AI agents like OpenClaw run with elevated privileges on users' local machines, where a single successful prompt injection can leak credentials, redirect financial transactions, or destroy files. This threat goes well beyond…
Code agents powered by large language models can execute shell commands on behalf of users, introducing severe security vulnerabilities. This paper presents a two-phase security analysis of the OpenClaw platform. As an open-source AI agent…
Autonomous AI agents extend large language models into full runtime systems that load skills, ingest external content, maintain memory, plan multi-step actions, and invoke privileged tools. In such systems, security failures rarely remain…
Autonomous coding agents are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, offering capabilities that extend beyond code suggestion to active system interaction and environment management. OpenClaw, a representative platform…
Agentic AI systems, specifically LLM-driven agents that plan, invoke tools, maintain persistent memory, and delegate tasks to peer agents via protocols such as MCP and A2A, introduce a threat surface that differs materially from standalone…
Tool-augmented LLM agents introduce security risks that extend beyond user-input filtering, including indirect prompt injection through fetched content, unsafe tool execution, credential leakage, and tampering with local control files. We…
The rise of OpenClaw in early 2026 marks the moment when millions of users began deploying personal AI agents into their daily lives, delegating tasks ranging from travel planning to multi-step research. This scale of adoption signals that…
LLM agents process trusted instructions, retrieved records, and tool observations through a common generative channel. This conflates data flow with authority: an untrusted string can affect a secret-bearing response or an action proposal…
Tool-augmented AI agents substantially extend the practical capabilities of large language models, but they also introduce security risks that cannot be identified through model-only evaluation. In this paper, we present a systematic…
The safety of autonomous AI agents is increasingly recognized as a critical open problem. As agents transition from passive text generators to active actors capable of executing shell commands, modifying files, calling APIs, and browsing…
Autonomous LLM-based agents increasingly operate as long-running processes forming densely interconnected multi-agent ecosystems, whose security properties remain largely unexplored. In particular, OpenClaw, an open-source platform with…
Prompt injection remains one of the most practical attack vectors against LLM-integrated applications. We replicate the Microsoft LLMail-Inject benchmark (Greshake et al., 2024) against current generation models running inside OpenClaw, an…
Autonomous agents based on large language models (LLMs) are rapidly emerging as a general-purpose technology, with recent systems such as OpenClaw extending their capabilities through broad tool use, third-party skills, and deeper…
As AI systems gain increasing autonomy and execution capability, the number of discovered security vulnerabilities continues to rise. However, many of these vulnerabilities are not fundamentally novel, but instead reflect recurring classes…