相关论文: From Admission to Invariants: Measuring Deviation …
Autonomous AI agents can remain fully authorized and still become unsafe as behavior drifts, adversaries adapt, and decision patterns shift without any code change. We propose the \textbf{Informational Viability Principle}: governing an…
Multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems have emerged as powerful architectures for complex task decomposition and collaborative problem-solving. However, their long-term behavioral stability remains largely unexamined. This study…
Behavioral evaluation is the dominant paradigm for assessing alignment in large language models (LLMs). In current practice, observed compliance under finite evaluation protocols is treated as evidence of latent alignment. However, the…
LLM-based agents can execute actions that are syntactically valid, user-sanctioned, and semantically appropriate, yet still violate organizational policy because the facts needed for correct policy judgment are hidden at decision time. We…
We study inverse mechanism learning: recovering an unknown incentive-generating mechanism from observed strategic interaction traces of self-interested learning agents. Unlike inverse game theory and multi-agent inverse reinforcement…
AI agents dynamically acquire tools, orchestrate sub-agents, and transact across organizational boundaries, yet no existing security layer verifies what an agent can do, whether it executed what it claims, or what happened in a multi-agent…
Multi-Agentic AI systems, powered by large language models (LLMs), are inherently non-deterministic and prone to silent failures such as drift, cycles, and missing details in outputs, which are difficult to detect. We introduce the task of…
A robot's deployment environment often involves perceptual changes that differ from what it has experienced during training. Standard practices such as data augmentation attempt to bridge this gap by augmenting source images in an effort to…
We consider a setting for Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) where the learner is extended with the ability to actively select multiple environments, observing an agent's behavior on each environment. We first demonstrate that if the…
In standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) settings, the interaction between the agent and the environment is typically modeled as a Markov Decision Process (MDP), which assumes that the agent observes the system state instantaneously, selects…
As autonomous and agentic AI systems scale in robotic and human-machine environments, managing hallucination and persistent but unjustified action remains an open challenge. Rather than attributing these failures solely to model or…
Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) provides a promising way for intelligent agents (e.g., autonomous vehicles) to learn to navigate complex scenarios. However, DRL with neural networks as function approximators is typically considered a…
When an LLM agent reads a confidential file, then writes a summary, then emails it externally, no single step is unsafe, but the sequence is a data leak. We call this safety drift: individually safe actions compounding into violations.…
Can a multimodal language model learn to manipulate physical objects by reasoning about its own failures-without gradient updates, demonstrations, or reward engineering? We argue the answer is yes, under conditions we characterise…
Accurate and interpretable car-following models are essential for traffic simulation and autonomous vehicle development. However, classical models like the Intelligent Driver Model (IDM) are fundamentally limited by their parsimonious and…
As autonomous coding agents become deeply embedded in software development workflows, their high operational velocity introduces a critical oversight challenge: the accumulating divergence between agentic actions and architectural intent.…
Nonlinear systems of affine control inputs overarch many sensor fusion instances. Analyzing whether a state variable in such a nonlinear system can be estimated (i.e., observability) informs better estimator design. Among the research on…
Safety evaluation for advanced AI systems assumes that behavior observed under evaluation predicts behavior in deployment. This assumption weakens for agents with situational awareness, which may exploit regime leakage, cues distinguishing…
As LLM-based systems increasingly operate as agents embedded within human social and technical systems, alignment can no longer be treated as a property of an isolated model, but must be understood in relation to the environments in which…
Reinforcement learning (RL) agents typically assume stationary environment dynamics. Yet in real-world applications such as healthcare, robotics, and finance, transition probabilities or reward functions may evolve, leading to model drift.…