相关论文: Graded Symbolic Verification with a Fuzzy Dolev-Ya…

Current formal verification of security protocols relies on specialized researchers and complex tools, inaccessible to protocol designers who informally evaluate their work with emulators. This paper addresses this gap by embedding symbolic…

The implementation of security protocols often combines different languages. This practice, however, poses a challenge to traditional verification techniques, which typically assume a single-language environment and, therefore, are…

Logics for security protocol analysis require the formalization of an adversary model that specifies the capabilities of adversaries. A common model is the Dolev-Yao model, which considers only adversaries that can compose and replay…

Security protocols are often found to be flawed after their deployment. We present an approach that aims at the neutralization or mitigation of the attacks to flawed protocols: it avoids the complete dismissal of the interested protocol and…

We propose a rule-based anomaly detection system for railway signalling that mitigates attacks by a Dolev-Yao attacker who is able to inject control commands and to perform semantic attacks. The system as well mitigates the effects of a…

In security protocol analysis, the traditional choice to consider a single Dolev-Yao attacker is supported by the fact that models with multiple collaborating Dolev-Yao attackers have been shown to be reducible to models with one Dolev-Yao…

To deflect adversarial attacks, a range of "certified" classifiers have been proposed. In addition to labeling an image, certified classifiers produce (when possible) a certificate guaranteeing that the input image is not an…

We present an investigation into the design and implementation of a parallel model checker for security protocol verification that is based on a symbolic model of the adversary, where instantiations of concrete terms and messages are…

This document presents the security protocol verifier CryptoVerif.CryptoVerif does not rely on the symbolic, Dolev-Yao model, but on the computational model. It can verify secrecy, correspondence (which include authentication), and…

Automated vulnerability detection in critical-infrastructure software confronts a fundamental barrier: industrial software is routinely deployed as stripped, symbol-free binaries that deprive conventional Software Composition Analysis of…

As mobile devices pervade physical space, the familiar authentication patterns are becoming insufficient: besides entity authentication, many applications require, e.g., location authentication. Many interesting protocols have been proposed…

Implementations of network protocols are often prone to vulnerabilities caused by developers' mistakes when accessing memory regions and dealing with arithmetic operations. Finding practical approaches for checking the security of network…

Control flow in unstructured programs can be complex and dynamic, which makes static analysis difficult. Yet, automated reasoning about unstructured control flow is important when certifying properties of binary (machine) code in…

As a case study in cryptographic binding, we present a formal-methods analysis of the cryptographic channel binding mechanisms in the Fast IDentity Online (FIDO) Universal Authentication Framework (UAF) authentication protocol, which seeks…

Rule-based systems remain central in safety-critical domains but often struggle with scalability, brittleness, and goal misspecification. These limitations can lead to reward hacking and failures in formal verification, as AI systems tend…

Traditional methods for formal verification (FV) of deep neural networks (DNNs) are constrained by a binary encoding of safety properties, where a model is classified as either safe or unsafe (robust or not robust). This binary encoding…

Reasoning about security properties involves reasoning about where the information of a system is located, and how it evolves over time. While most security analysis techniques need to cope with some notions of information locality and…

We propose extensions to the Dolev-Yao attacker model to make it suitable for arguments about security of Cyber-Physical Systems. The Dolev-Yao attacker model uses a set of rules to define potential actions by an attacker with respect to…

In modern software development, vulnerability detection is crucial due to the inevitability of bugs and vulnerabilities in complex software systems. Effective detection and elimination of these vulnerabilities during the testing phase are…

Gradual verification, which supports explicitly partial specifications and verifies them with a combination of static and dynamic checks, makes verification more incremental and provides earlier feedback to developers. While an abstract,…