相关论文: Composable, unconditional security without a Quant…

The security of prepare-and-measure satellite-based quantum key distribution (QKD), under restricted eavesdropping scenarios, is addressed. We particularly consider cases where the eavesdropper, Eve, has limited access to the transmitted…

We show that covert secret key expansion is possible using a public authenticated classical channel and a quantum channel largely under control of an adversary, which we precisely define. We also prove a converse result showing that, under…

One crucial step in any quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme is parameter estimation. In a typical QKD protocol the users have to sacrifice part of their raw data to estimate the parameters of the communication channel as, for example, the…

We obtain estimates for Eve's forgery probability, namely the probability that she is able to forge a message which Alice or Bob mistakenly accept over a noisy Quantum channel for generating a shared Quantum secret key. This probability is…

Quantum key distribution allows two parties, traditionally known as Alice and Bob, to establish a secure random cryptographic key if, firstly, they have access to a quantum communication channel, and secondly, they can exchange classical…

Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a promising approach to secure communications, with continuous-variable QKD (CV-QKD) offering compatibility with existing telecommunication infrastructure. Despite this advantage, CV-QKD is limited by…

We propose several methods for quantum key distribution (QKD) based upon the generation and transmission of random distributions of coherent or squeezed states, and we show that they are are secure against individual eavesdropping attacks.…

The theory of quantum cryptography aims to guarantee unconditional information-theoretic security against an omnipotent eavesdropper. In many practical scenarios, however, the assumption of an all-powerful adversary is excessive and can be…

This paper suggests an improvement to the BB84 scheme in Quantum key distribution. The original scheme has its weakness in letting quantifiably more information gain to an eavesdropper during public announcement of unencrypted bases lists.…

We consider a setup in which the channel from Alice to Bob is less noisy than the channel from Eve to Bob. We show that there exist encoding and decoding which accomplish error correction and authentication simultaneously; that is, Bob is…

Employing the fundamental laws of quantum physics, Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) promises the unconditionally secure distribution of cryptographic keys. However, in practical realisations, a QKD protocol is only secure, when the quantum…

Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows Alice and Bob to agree on a shared secret key, while communicating over a public (untrusted) quantum channel. Compared to classical key exchange, it has two main advantages: (i) The key is…

Recent research in quantum cryptography has led to the development of schemes that encrypt and authenticate quantum messages with computational security. The security definitions used so far in the literature are asymptotic, game-based, and…

When the 4-state or the 6-state protocol of quantum cryptography is carried out on a noisy (i.e. realistic) quantum channel, then the raw key has to be processed to reduce the information of an adversary Eve down to an arbitrarily low…

With the increasing demand for secure communication in optical space networks, it is essential to develop physical-layer scalable security solutions. In this context, we present the asymptotic security analysis of a keyless quantum private…

In the direct communication quantum channels the authorized recipient (Bob) and the non-authorized recipient (Eve) have different abilities for verification of received information. Bob can apply the feedback to commit the sender (Alice) to…

Quantum cryptography shows that one can guarantee the secrecy of correlation on the sole basis of the laws of physics, that is without limiting the computational power of the eavesdropper. The usual security proofs suppose that the…

Assume that two distant parties, Alice and Bob, as well as an adversary, Eve, have access to (quantum) systems prepared jointly according to a tripartite state. In addition, Alice and Bob can use local operations and authenticated public…

We introduce noise-adaptive quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, in which the honest parties optimize the encoding (state preparation) and decoding (measurement basis) operations according to the noise models affecting the honest…

We consider a group of $m$ trusted and authenticated nodes that aim to create a shared secret key $K$ over a wireless channel in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve. We assume that there exists a state dependent wireless broadcast channel…