相关论文: When In Doubt, Abstain: The Impact of Abstention o…
As machine learning algorithms increasingly influence critical decision making in different application areas, understanding human strategic behavior in response to these systems becomes vital. We explore individuals' choice between…
We study an online linear classification problem, in which the data is generated by strategic agents who manipulate their features in an effort to change the classification outcome. In rounds, the learner deploys a classifier, and an…
Strategic classification addresses a learning problem where a decision-maker implements a classifier over agents who may manipulate their features in order to receive favorable predictions. In the standard model of online strategic…
We explore the problem of binary classification in machine learning, with a twist - the classifier is allowed to abstain on any datum, professing ignorance about the true class label without committing to any prediction. This is directly…
Ranking systems influence decision-making in high-stakes domains like health, education, and employment, where they can have substantial economic and social impacts. This makes the integration of safety mechanisms essential. One such…
This paper studies algorithmic decision-making under human's strategic behavior, where a decision maker uses an algorithm to make decisions about human agents, and the latter with information about the algorithm may exert effort…
In strategic classification, agents modify their features, at a cost, to ideally obtain a positive classification from the learner's classifier. The typical response of the learner is to carefully modify their classifier to be robust to…
Strategic classification studies the problem where self-interested individuals or agents manipulate their response to obtain favorable decision outcomes made by classifiers, typically turning to dishonest actions when they are less costly…
We propose a new variant of the strategic classification problem: a principal reveals a classifier, and $n$ agents report their (possibly manipulated) features to be classified. Motivated by real-world applications, our model crucially…
Classification with abstention has gained a lot of attention in recent years as it allows to incorporate human decision-makers in the process. Yet, abstention can potentially amplify disparities and lead to discriminatory predictions. The…
Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable…
When consequential decisions are informed by algorithmic input, individuals may feel compelled to alter their behavior in order to gain a system's approval. Models of agent responsiveness, termed "strategic manipulation," analyze the…
We address the question of repeatedly learning linear classifiers against agents who are strategically trying to game the deployed classifiers, and we use the Stackelberg regret to measure the performance of our algorithms. First, we show…
A binary classifier capable of abstaining from making a label prediction has two goals in tension: minimizing errors, and avoiding abstaining unnecessarily often. In this work, we exactly characterize the best achievable tradeoff between…
When users stand to gain from certain predictions, they are prone to act strategically to obtain favorable predictive outcomes. Whereas most works on strategic classification consider user actions that manifest as feature modifications, we…
As predictive models are deployed into the real world, they must increasingly contend with strategic behavior. A growing body of work on strategic classification treats this problem as a Stackelberg game: the decision-maker "leads" in the…
Abstaining classifiers have the option to abstain from making predictions on inputs that they are unsure about. These classifiers are becoming increasingly popular in high-stakes decision-making problems, as they can withhold uncertain…
Selective classification, in which models can abstain on uncertain predictions, is a natural approach to improving accuracy in settings where errors are costly but abstentions are manageable. In this paper, we find that while selective…
In this work, we consider a binary classification problem and cast it into a binary hypothesis testing framework, where the observations can be perturbed by an adversary. To improve the adversarial robustness of a classifier, we include an…
Policy learning algorithms are widely used in areas such as personalized medicine and advertising to develop individualized treatment regimes. However, most methods force a decision even when predictions are uncertain, which is risky in…