相关论文: ShieldMMU: Detecting and Defending against Control…

Side-channel attacks have become a severe threat to the confidentiality of computer applications and systems. One popular type of such attacks is the microarchitectural attack, where the adversary exploits the hardware features to break the…

The security goals of cloud providers and users include memory confidentiality and integrity, which requires implementing Replay-Attack protection (RAP). RAP can be achieved using integrity trees or mutually authenticated channels.…

Malware and cheat developers use fileless execution techniques to evade traditional, signature-based security products. These methods include various types of manual mapping, module stomping, and threadless injection which work entirely…

This paper provides the first systematic analysis of a synergistic threat model encompassing memory corruption vulnerabilities and microarchitectural side-channel vulnerabilities. We study speculative shield bypass attacks that leverage…

Recent discovery of security attacks in advanced processors, known as Spectre and Meltdown, has resulted in high public alertness about security of hardware. The root cause of these attacks is information leakage across "covert channels"…

In this paper we introduced countermeasures against side-channel attacks in the shared memory of TrustZone. We proposed zero-contention cache memory or policy between REE and TEE to prevent from TruSpy attacks in TrustZone. And we suggested…

Side-channel attacks on microprocessors, like the RISC-V, exhibit security vulnerabilities that lead to several design challenges. Hence, it is imperative to study and analyze these security vulnerabilities comprehensively. In this paper,…

Cryptographic libraries, an essential part of cybersecurity, are shown to be susceptible to different types of attacks, including side-channel and memory-corruption attacks. In this article, we examine popular cryptographic libraries in…

Power side-channel attacks are a very effective cryptanalysis technique that can infer secret keys of security ICs by monitoring the power consumption. Since the emergence of practical attacks in the late 90s, they have been a major threat…

Besides cryptographic secrets, side-channel attacks also leak sensitive user input. The most accurate attacks exploit cache timings or interrupt information to monitor keystroke timings and subsequently infer typed words and sentences.…

Performance Monitor Unit (PMU) is a significant hardware module on the current processors, which counts the events launched by processor into a set of PMU counters. Ideally, the events triggered by instructions that are executed but the…

Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU) is a recent hardware feature that allows programs to assign virtual memory pages to protection domains, and to change domain access permissions using inexpensive, unprivileged instructions. Several…

Nowadays, in operating systems, numerous protection mechanisms prevent or limit the user-mode applicationsto access the kernels internal information. This is regularlycarried out by software-based defenses such as Address Space Layout…

Modern processors have suffered a deluge of threats exploiting branch instruction collisions inside the branch prediction unit (BPU), from eavesdropping on secret-related branch operations to triggering malicious speculative executions.…

Trusted execution environments (TEEs) offer hardware-assisted means to protect code and data. However, as shown in numerous results over the years, attackers can use side-channels to leak data access patterns and even single-step the code.…

This paper presents SgxPectre Attacks that exploit the recently disclosed CPU bugs to subvert the confidentiality and integrity of SGX enclaves. Particularly, we show that when branch prediction of the enclave code can be influenced by…

Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) introduced new instructions to switch the processor to enclave mode which protects it from introspection. While the enclave mode strongly protects the memory and the state of the processor, it cannot…

Physical side-channel attacks can compromise the security of integrated circuits. Most physical side-channel attacks (e.g., power or electromagnetic) exploit the dynamic behavior of a chip, typically manifesting as changes in current…

In the recent past, we have witnessed the shift towards attacks on the microarchitectural CPU level. In particular, cache side-channels play a predominant role as they allow an attacker to exfiltrate secret information by exploiting the CPU…

FPGA-based hardware accelerators are becoming increasingly popular due to their versatility, customizability, energy efficiency, constant latency, and scalability. FPGAs can be tailored to specific algorithms, enabling efficient hardware…