相关论文: Keystroke Detection by Exploiting Unintended RF Em…
Wireless devices resorting to event-triggered communications have been proved to suffer critical privacy issues, due to the intrinsic leakage associated with radio-frequency (RF) emissions. In this paper, we move the attack frontier forward…
Unintended electromagnetic emissions, called EM emanations, can be exploited to recover sensitive information, posing security risks. Metal shielding, used by defense organizations to prevent data leakage, is costly and impractical for…
Using the keyboard LEDs to send data optically was proposed in 2002 by Loughry and Umphress [1] (Appendix A). In this paper we extensively explore this threat in the context of a modern cyber-attack with current hardware and optical…
Side-channel attacks consist of retrieving internal data from a victim system by analyzing its leakage, which usually requires proximity to the victim in the range of a few millimetres. Screaming channels are EM side channels transmitted at…
Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks (ASCAs) extract sensitive information by using audio emitted from a computing devices and their peripherals. Attacks targeting keyboards are popular and have been explored in the literature. However, similar…
Most electronic devices utilize mechanical keyboards to receive inputs, including sensitive information such as authentication credentials, personal and private data, emails, plans, etc. However, these systems are susceptible to acoustic…
Physical isolation from external networks - an airgap - aims to minimize exposure to remote attacks. Yet capable adversaries still achieve code execution on air-gapped systems, and prior work has shown that they can then wirelessly…
A previously unknown form of compromising emanations has been discovered. LED status indicators on data communication equipment, under certain conditions, are shown to carry a modulated optical signal that is significantly correlated with…
Wearables that constantly collect various sensor data of their users increase the chances for inferences of unintentional and sensitive information such as passwords typed on a physical keyboard. We take a thorough look at the potential of…
In ultralong fiber laser key distribution, two sides use standard optical equipment to create kilometer long fiber lasers in a communication link to establish a secret key. Its security rests on the assumption that any attacker would need…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols are proven secure based on fundamental physical laws, however, the proofs consider a well-defined setting and encoding of the sent quantum signals only. Side channels, where the encoded quantum state…
Millimeter-wave wireless networks offer high throughput and can (ideally) prevent eavesdropping attacks using narrow, directional beams. Unfortunately, imperfections in physical hardware mean today's antenna arrays all exhibit side lobes,…
An information-theoretic confidential communication is achievable if the eavesdropper has a degraded channel compared to the legitimate receiver. In wireless channels, beamforming and artificial noise can enable such confidentiality.…
Embedded devices are omnipresent in modern networks including the ones operating inside critical environments. However, due to their constrained nature, novel mechanisms are required to provide external, and non-intrusive anomaly detection.…
Key extraction via measuring a physical quantity is a class of information theoretic key exchange protocols that rely on the physical characteristics of the communication channel to enable the computation of a shared key by two (or more)…
This paper presents an experimental study on radio frequency (RF) fingerprinting of Bluetooth Classic devices. Our research aims to provide a practical evaluation of the possibilities for RF fingerprinting of everyday Bluetooth connected…
In recent years researchers have demonstrated how attackers could use USB connectors implanted with RF transmitters to exfiltrate data from secure, and even air-gapped, computers (e.g., COTTONMOUTH in the leaked NSA ANT catalog). Such…
Screaming-channel attacks enable Electromagnetic (EM) Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) at larger distances due to higher EM leakage energies than traditional SCAs, relaxing the requirement of close access to the victim. This attack can be…
Acoustic side-channel attacks on keyboards can bypass security measures in many systems that use keyboards as one of the input devices. These attacks aim to reveal users' sensitive information by targeting the sounds made by their keyboards…
Air-gapped systems are physically separated from external networks, including the Internet. This isolation is achieved by keeping the air-gap computers disconnected from wired or wireless networks, preventing direct or remote communication…