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Security of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) depends on the secrecy of the per-signature nonce. Even partial nonce leakage can expose the long-term private key through lattice-based cryptanalysis. In this paper, we…
Modern processors dynamically control their operating frequency to optimize resource utilization, maximize energy savings, and conform to system-defined constraints. If, during the execution of a software workload, the running average of…
Power analysis is a branch of side channel attacks where power consumption data is used as the side channel to attack the system. First using a device like an oscilloscope power traces are collected when the cryptographic device is doing…
Side-channel attacks are a security exploit that take advantage of information leakage. They use measurement and analysis of physical parameters to reverse engineer and extract secrets from a system. Power analysis attacks in particular,…
The transient execution attack is a type of attack leveraging the vulnerability of modern CPU optimization technologies. New attacks surface rapidly. The side-channel is a key part of transient execution attacks to leak data. In this work,…
With the recent advancements in machine learning theory, many commercial embedded micro-processors use neural network models for a variety of signal processing applications. However, their associated side-channel security vulnerabilities…
Side-channel attacks exploit variations in non-functional behaviors to expose sensitive information across security boundaries. Existing methods leverage side-channels based on power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, silicon substrate…
Side-channel attacks try to extract secret information from a system by analyzing different side-channel signatures, such as power consumption, electromagnetic emanation, thermal dissipation, acoustics, time, etc. Power-based side-channel…
Transient execution attacks utilize micro-architectural covert channels to leak secrets that should not have been accessible during logical program execution. Commonly used micro-architectural covert channels are those that leave lasting…
To meet the ever-growing need for performance in silicon devices, SoC providers have been increasingly relying on software-hardware cooperation. By controlling hardware resources such as power or clock management from the software,…
Side-channel attacks on memory (SCAM) exploit unintended data leaks from memory subsystems to infer sensitive information, posing significant threats to system security. These attacks exploit vulnerabilities in memory access patterns, cache…
Traditionally, power side-channel analysis requires physical access to the target device, as well as specialized devices to measure the power consumption with enough precision. Recently research has shown that on x86 platforms, on-chip…
We present a novel mechanism to construct a covert channel based on page faults. A page fault is an event that occurs when a process or a thread tries to access a page of memory that is not currently mapped to its address space. The kernel…
The security of computers is at risk because of information leaking through physical outputs such as power, temperature, or electromagnetic (EM) emissions. Attackers can use advanced signal measurement and analysis to recover sensitive data…
Modern processors utilize an increasingly large register set to facilitate efficient floating point and SIMD computation. This large register set is a burden for operating systems, as its content needs to be saved and restored when the…
Power side channel is a very important category of side channels, which can be exploited to steal confidential information from a computing system by analyzing its power consumption. In this paper, we demonstrate the existence of various…
Side-channel attacks consist of retrieving internal data from a victim system by analyzing its leakage, which usually requires proximity to the victim in the range of a few millimetres. Screaming channels are EM side channels transmitted at…
Modern processors use branch prediction and speculative execution to maximize performance. For example, if the destination of a branch depends on a memory value that is in the process of being read, CPUs will try guess the destination and…
Side-channel attacks (SCAs), which infer secret information (for example secret keys) by exploiting information that leaks from the implementation (such as power consumption), have been shown to be a non-negligible threat to modern…
Power-based side-channel is a serious security threat to the System on Chip (SoC). The secret information is leaked from the power profile of the system while a cryptographic algorithm is running. The mitigation requires efforts from both…