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We propose a method for engineering security protocols that are aware of timing aspects. We study a simplified version of the well-known Needham Schroeder protocol and the complete Yahalom protocol, where timing information allows the study…

In recent times, many protocols have been proposed to provide security for various information and communication systems. Such protocols must be tested for their functional correctness before they are used in practice. Application of formal…

Based on our previous work on truly concurrent process algebras APTC, we use it to verify the security protocols. This work (called Secure APTC, abbreviated SAPTC) have the following advantages in verifying security protocols: (1) It has a…

This white paper demonstrates how the assurance, reliability, and security of an existing professional-grade, open-source embedded TCP/IP stack implementation written in the C programming language is significantly enhanced by adopting the…

Recent advances in natural language processing and the increased use of large language models have exposed new security vulnerabilities, such as backdoor attacks. Previous backdoor attacks require input manipulation after model distribution…

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as powerful tools for diverse applications. However, their uniform token processing paradigm introduces critical vulnerabilities in instruction handling, particularly when exposed to adversarial…

We introduce a first proofs-as-parallel-programs correspondence for classical logic. We define a parallel and more powerful extension of the simply typed lambda calculus corresponding to an analytic natural deduction based on the excluded…

Multitier programming languages reduce the complexity of developing distributed systems by developing the distributed system in a single coherent code base. The compiler or the runtime separate the code for the components of the distributed…

The formal analysis of security protocols is a challenging field, with various approaches being studied nowadays. The famous Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic was the first logical system aiming to validate security protocols. Combining ideas…

We present a framework suited to the analysis of cryptographic protocols that make use of time in their execution. We provide a process algebra syntax that makes time information available to processes, and a transition semantics that takes…

Aliasing is a known source of challenges in the context of imperative object-oriented languages, which have led to important advances in type systems for aliasing control. However, their large-scale adoption has turned out to be a…

Security protocols stipulate how the remote principals of a computer network should interact in order to obtain specific security goals. The crucial goals of confidentiality and authentication may be achieved in various forms, each of…

Security protocols are essential building blocks of modern IT systems. Subtle flaws in their design or implementation may compromise the security of entire systems. It is, thus, important to prove the absence of such flaws through formal…

Although it has been demonstrated that Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithms are vulnerable to deliberate attacks, the question of whether such weaknesses can lead to software security threats is under-explored. To bridge this gap,…

Security verification of communication protocols in industrial and safety-critical systems is challenging because implementations are often proprietary, accessible only as black boxes, and too complex for manual modeling. As a result,…

It is now well-admitted that formal methods are helpful for many issues raised in the Web service area. In this paper we present a framework for the design and verification of WSs using process algebras and their tools. We define a two-way…

We propose to analyse quantum protocols by applying formal verification techniques developed in classical computing for the analysis of communicating concurrent systems. One area of successful application of these techniques is that of…

AI agents that interact with the real world through tool calls pose fundamental safety challenges: agents might leak private information, cause unintended side effects, or be manipulated through prompt injection. To address these…

The implications of backdoor attacks on English-centric large language models (LLMs) have been widely examined - such attacks can be achieved by embedding malicious behaviors during training and activated under specific conditions that…

This paper presents the Soda language for verifying multi-agent systems. Soda is a high-level functional and object-oriented language that supports the compilation of its code not only to Scala, a strongly statically typed high-level…