相关论文: Ain't How You Deploy: An Analysis of BGP Security …

As the rollout of secure route origin authentication with the RPKI slowly gains traction among network operators, there is a push to standardize secure path validation for BGP (i.e., S*BGP: S-BGP, soBGP, BGPSEC, etc.). Origin authentication…

The Internet relies on routing protocols to direct traffic efficiently across interconnected networks, with the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) serving as the core mechanism managing routing between autonomous systems. However, BGP…

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is an important component in today's IP network infrastructure. As the main routing protocol of the Internet, clear understanding of its dynamics is crucial for configuring, diagnosing and debugging…

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) sets up routes between the smaller networks that make up the Internet. Despite its crucial role, BGP is notoriously vulnerable to serious problems, including (1) propagation of bogus routing information due…

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) remains a fragile pillar of Internet routing. BGP hijacks still occurr daily. While full deployment of Route Origin Validation (ROV) is ongoing, attackers have already adapted, launching post-ROV attacks…

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is a distributed protocol that manages interdomain routing without requiring a centralized record of which autonomous systems (ASes) connect to which others. Many methods have been devised to infer the AS…

Harmful Internet hijacking incidents put in evidence how fragile the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is, which is used to exchange routing information between Autonomous Systems (ASes). As proved by recent research contributions, even S-BGP,…

BGP is the de facto protocol used for inter-autonomous system routing in the Internet. Generally speaking, BGP has been proven to be secure, efficient, scalable, and robust. However, with the rapid evolving of the Internet in the past few…

Multipath BGP (M-BGP) allows a BGP router to install multiple 'equally-good' paths, via parallel inter-domain border links, to a destination prefix. M-BGP differs from the multipath routing techniques in many ways, e.g. M-BGP is only…

Tor is vulnerable to network-level adversaries who can observe both ends of the communication to deanonymize users. Recent work has shown that Tor is susceptible to the previously unknown active BGP routing attacks, called RAPTOR attacks,…

BGP is vulnerable to a series of attacks. Many solutions have been proposed in the past two decades, but the most effective remain largely undeployed. This is due to three fundamental reasons: the solutions are too computationally expensive…

The internet is now-a-days experiencing a stress due to some inherent problems with the main interdomain routing protocol, boarder gateway protocol (BGP), the amount of time it takes to converge, number of update message exchanged followed…

The Internet inter-domain routing system is vulnerable. On the control plane, the de facto Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) does not have built-in mechanisms to authenticate routing announcements, so an adversary can announce virtually…

This paper concerns the problem of the absence of ingress filtering at the network edge, one of the main causes of important network security issues. Numerous network operators do not deploy the best current practice - Source Address…

The Internet provides physical path diversity between a large number of hosts, making it possible for networks to use alternative paths when one path fails to deliver the required Quality of Service. However, for various reasons, many…

Security protocols are often found to be flawed after their deployment. We present an approach that aims at the neutralization or mitigation of the attacks to flawed protocols: it avoids the complete dismissal of the interested protocol and…

Networks (Autonomous Systems-AS) allocate or revoke IP prefixes with the intervention of official Internet resource number authorities, and select and advertise policy-compliant paths towards these prefixes using the inter-domain routing…

In the context of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), inbound inter-domain traffic engineering (TE) remains a difficult problem without panacea. Each of previously investigated method solves a part of the problem. In this study, we try to…

Internet of Things (IoT) devices can be exploited by the attackers as entry points to break into the IoT networks without early detection. Little work has taken hybrid approaches that combine different defense mechanisms in an optimal way…

In most PUF-based authentication schemes, a central server is usually engaged to verify the response of the device's PUF to challenge bit-streams. However, the server availability may be intermittent in practice. To tackle such an issue,…