相关论文: SecScale: A Scalable and Secure Trusted Execution …

In TrustZone-assisted TEEs, the trusted OS has unrestricted access to both secure and normal world memory. Unfortunately, this architectural limitation has opened an aisle of exploration for attackers, which have demonstrated how to…

Trusted execution environments (TEEs) provide an environment for running workloads in the cloud without having to trust cloud service providers, by offering additional hardware-assisted security guarantees. However, main memory encryption…

General-purpose operating systems (GPOS), such as Linux, encompass several million lines of code. Statistically, a larger code base inevitably leads to a higher number of potential vulnerabilities and inherently a more vulnerable system. To…

MapReduce is a programming model used extensively for parallel data processing in distributed environments. A wide range of algorithms were implemented using MapReduce, from simple tasks like sorting and searching up to complex clustering…

Large-scale systems that compute analytics over a fleet of devices must achieve high privacy and security standards while also meeting data quality, usability, and resource efficiency expectations. We present a next-generation federated…

Intel(R) Software Guard Extensions (Intel(R) SGX) is a promising technology to securely process information in otherwise untrusted environments. An important aspect of Intel SGX is the ability to perform remote attestation to assess the…

Cloud computing is a ubiquitous solution to handle today's complex computing demands. However, it comes with data privacy concerns, as the cloud service provider has complete access to code and data running on their infrastructure. VM-based…

The logic of many protocols relies on time measurements. However, in Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) like Intel SGX, the time source is outside the Trusted Computing Base: a malicious system hosting the TEE can manipulate that TEE's…

Intel SGX provisions shielded executions for security-sensitive computation, but lacks support for trusted system services (TSS), such as clock, network and filesystem. This makes \textit{enclaves} vulnerable to Iago…

Recommenders are central in many applications today. The most effective recommendation schemes, such as those based on collaborative filtering (CF), exploit similarities between user profiles to make recommendations, but potentially expose…

Modern CPU architectures offer strong isolation guarantees towards user applications in the form of enclaves. For instance, Intel's threat model for SGX assumes fully trusted enclaves, yet there is an ongoing debate on whether this threat…

Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) enables user-level code to create private memory regions called enclaves, whose code and data are protected by the CPU from software and hardware attacks outside the enclaves. Recent work introduces…

FPGAs are now used in public clouds to accelerate a wide range of applications, including many that operate on sensitive data such as financial and medical records. We present ShEF, a trusted execution environment (TEE) for cloud-based…

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) suffer from performance issues when executing certain management instructions, such as creating an enclave, context switching in and out of protected mode, and swapping cached pages. This is especially…

Existing tools to detect side-channel attacks on Intel SGX are grounded on the observation that attacks affect the performance of the victim application. As such, all detection tools monitor the potential victim and raise an alarm if the…

This paper presents PUBSUB-SGX, a content-based publish-subscribe system that exploits trusted execution environments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX, to guarantee confidentiality and integrity of data as well as anonymity and privacy of…

Efficient cloud computing relies on in-process isolation to optimize performance by running workloads within a single process. Without heavy-weight process isolation, memory safety errors pose a significant security threat by allowing an…

Applications running in Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) commonly use untrusted external services such as host File System. Adversaries may maliciously alter the normal service behavior to trigger subtle application bugs that would…

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in circuit design tasks and have typically undergone multiple rounds of training. Both the trained models and their associated training data are considered confidential intellectual…

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are gradually adopted by major cloud providers, offering a practical option of \emph{confidential computing} for users who don't fully trust public clouds. TEEs use CPU-enabled hardware features to…