相关论文: Analysing Guarantees in Australian Senate Outcomes

We survey the design of elections that are resilient to attempted interference by third parties. For example, suppose votes have been cast in an election between two candidates, and then each vote is randomly changed with a small…

We present a new model that describes the process of electing a group of representatives (e.g., a parliament) for a group of voters. In this model, called the voting committee model, the elected group of representatives runs a number of…

Cooperation in the form of vote trading, also known as logrolling, is central for law-making processes, shaping the development of democratic societies. Empirical evidence of logrolling is scarce and limited to highly specific situations…

This paper examines an area of Game Theory called Voting Power Theory. With the adoption of a measure theoretic framework it argues that the many different indices and tools currently used for measuring voting power can be replaced by just…

Voting power determines the "power" of individuals who cast votes; their power is based on their ability to influence the winning-ness of a coalition. Usually each individual acts alone, casting either all or none of their votes and is…

Most work on manipulation assumes that all preferences are known to the manipulators. However, in many settings elections are open and sequential, and manipulators may know the already cast votes but may not know the future votes. We…

The integrity of elections is central to democratic systems. However, a myriad of malicious actors aspire to influence election outcomes for financial or political benefit. A common means to such ends is by manipulating perceptions of the…

Selene is an e-voting protocol that allows voters to directly check their individual vote, in cleartext, in the final tally via a tracker system, while providing good coercion mitigation. This is in contrast to conventional, end-to-end…

The proportional veto principle, which captures the idea that a candidate vetoed by a large group of voters should not be chosen, has been studied for ranked ballots in single-winner voting. We introduce a version of this principle for…

We extend Approval voting to the settings where voters may have intransitive preferences. The major obstacle to applying Approval voting in these settings is that voters are not able to clearly determine who they should approve or…

Postal voting is growing rapidly in the U.S., with 43% of voters casting ballots by mail in 2020, yet until recently there has been little research about extending the protections of end-to-end verifiable (E2E-V) election schemes to…

Candidate control of elections is the study of how adding or removing candidates can affect the outcome. However, the traditional study of the complexity of candidate control is in the model in which all candidates and votes are known up…

We consider the complexity of deciding the winner of an election under the Slater rule. In this setting we are given a tournament $T = (V, A)$, where the vertices of V represent candidates and the direction of each arc indicates which of…

In approval-based committee (ABC) voting, the goal is to choose a subset of predefined size of the candidates based on the voters' approval preferences over the candidates. While this problem has attracted significant attention in recent…

We introduce a voting model with multi-agent ranked delegations. This model generalises liquid democracy in two aspects: first, an agent's delegation can use the votes of multiple other agents to determine their own -- for instance, an…

We present a substantially expanded version of our tool STV for strategy synthesis and verification of strategic abilities. The new version provides a web interface and support for assume-guarantee verification of multi-agent systems.

Many voter-verifiable, coercion-resistant schemes have been proposed, but even the most carefully designed systems necessarily leak information via the announced result. In corner cases, this may be problematic. For example, if all the…

Each voter $i \in I$ has $\alpha_i$ cards that (s)he distributes among the candidates $a \in A$ as a measure of approval. One (or several) candidate(s) who received the maximum number of cards is (are) elected. We provide polynomial…

In the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must be distributed among parties in proportion to the number of voters supporting each party. We study a generalization of this setting, in which voters can support multiple parties by…

We consider the following problem in which a given number of items has to be chosen from a predefined set. Each item is described by a vector of attributes and for each attribute there is a desired distribution that the selected set should…