相关论文: Assume but Verify: Deductive Verification of Leake…

Realizing flow security in a concurrent environment is extremely challenging, primarily due to non-deterministic nature of execution. The difficulty is further exacerbated from a security angle if sequential threads disclose control…

Side channel attacks have emerged as a serious threat to the security of both networked and embedded systems -- in particular through the implementations of cryptographic operations. Side channels can be difficult to model formally, but…

Language-based information flow security aims to decide whether an action-observable program can unintentionally leak confidential information if it has the authority to access confidential data. Recent concerns about declassification…

We present a deductive approach for the analysis of secure information flows with support for fine-grained policies that include declassifications in the form of delimited information release. By explicitly tracking the dependencies of…

It is common to prove by reasoning over source code that programs do not leak sensitive data. But doing so leaves a gap between reasoning and reality that can only be filled by accounting for the behaviour of the compiler. This task is…

Concurrent programming under weak memory concurrency faces substantial challenges to ensure correctness due to program behaviors that cannot be explained by thread interleaving, a.k.a. sequential consistency. While several program logics…

In this paper we describe a method for verifying secure information flow of programs, where apart from direct and indirect flows a secret information can be leaked through covert timing channels. That is, no two computations of a program…

We present an approach to program reasoning which inserts between a program and its verification conditions an additional layer, the denotation of the program expressed in a declarative form. The program is first translated into its…

We present a novel and well automatable approach to formal verification of programs with underspecified semantics, i.e., a language semantics that leaves open the order of certain evaluations. First, we reduce this problem to…

This work provides a study to demonstrate the potential of using off-the-shelf programming languages and their theories to build sound language-based-security tools. Our study focuses on information flow security encompassing…

Hardware-software contracts are abstract specifications of a CPU's leakage behavior. They enable verifying the security of high-level programs against side-channel attacks without having to explicitly reason about the microarchitectural…

A program verifier is a tool that can be used to verify that a "contract" for a program holds - i.e. given a precondition the program guarantees that a given postcondition holds - by only working at the level of the annotated program. An…

Memory-safety issues and information leakage are known to be depressingly common. We consider the compositional static detection of these kinds of vulnerabilities in first-order C-like programs. Indeed the latter are relational hyper-safety…

We present a novel and well automatable approach to formal verification of C programs with underspecified semantics, i.e., a language semantics that leaves open the order of certain evaluations. First, we reduce this problem to…

Methods for proving that concurrent software does not leak its secrets has remained an active topic of research for at least the past four decades. Despite an impressive array of work, the present situation remains highly unsatisfactory.…

Privacy leakage in AI-based decision processes poses significant risks, particularly when sensitive information can be inferred. We propose a formal framework to audit privacy leakage using abductive explanations, which identifies minimal…

Writing correct programs for weak memory models such as the C11 memory model is challenging because of the weak consistency guarantees these models provide. The first program logics for the verification of such programs have recently been…

Policy compliance detection is the task of ensuring that a scenario conforms to a policy (e.g. a claim is valid according to government rules or a post in an online platform conforms to community guidelines). This task has been previously…

Contracts specifying a procedure's behavior in terms of pre- and postconditions are essential for scalable software verification, but cannot express any constraints on the events occurring during execution of the procedure. This…

We present verification methods for logic programs with delay declarations. The verified properties are termination and freedom from errors related to built-ins. Concerning termination, we present two approaches. The first approach tries to…