相关论文: SafeLLVM: LLVM Without The ROP Gadgets!

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) undergo safety alignment to suppress harmful content. However, current defenses predominantly target explicit malicious patterns in the input representation, often overlooking the vulnerabilities…

Return Oriented Programming (ROP) is a technique by which an attacker can induce arbitrary behavior inside a vulnerable program without injecting a malicious code. The continues failure of the currently deployed defenses against ROP has…

This paper provides the first analysis on the feasibility of Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) on RISC-V, a new instruction set architecture targeting embedded systems. We show the existence of a new class of gadgets, using several Linear…

Software obfuscation plays a crucial role in protecting intellectual property in software from reverse engineering attempts. While some obfuscation techniques originate from the obfuscation-reverse engineering arms race, others stem from…

Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) is a software exploit for system compromise. By chaining short instruction sequences from existing code pieces, ROP can bypass static code-integrity checking approaches and non-executable page protections.…

With the discovery of new exploit techniques, new protection mechanisms are needed as well. Mitigations like DEP (Data Execution Prevention) or ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) created a significantly more difficult environment for…

The increasing sophistication of large vision-language models (LVLMs) has been accompanied by advances in safety alignment mechanisms designed to prevent harmful content generation. However, these defenses remain vulnerable to sophisticated…

Control Flow Hijacking attacks have posed a serious threat to the security of applications for a long time where an attacker can damage the control Flow Integrity of the program and execute arbitrary code. These attacks can be performed by…

Control-flow attacks, usually achieved by exploiting a buffer-overflow vulnerability, have been a serious threat to system security for over fifteen years. Researchers have answered the threat with various mitigation techniques, but…

Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) is a typical attack technique that exploits return addresses to abuse existing code repeatedly. Most of the current return address protecting mechanisms (also known as the Backward-Edge Control-Flow…

Just-in-time return-oriented programming (JIT-ROP) allows one to dynamically discover instruction pages and launch code reuse attacks, effectively bypassing most fine-grained address space layout randomization (ASLR) protection. However,…

Run-time attacks against programs written in memory-unsafe programming languages (e.g., C and C++) remain a prominent threat against computer systems. The prevalence of techniques like return-oriented programming (ROP) in attacking…

Return-oriented programming (ROP) is a code reuse attack that chains short snippets of existing code to perform arbitrary operations on target machines. Existing detection methods against ROP exhibit unsatisfactory detection accuracy and/or…

Code-reuse attacks have become a kind of common attack method, in which attackers use the existing code in the program to hijack the control flow. Most existing defenses focus on control flow integrity (CFI), code randomization, and…

Jailbreak attacks pose a serious threat to the safety of Large Language Models (LLMs) by crafting adversarial prompts that bypass alignment mechanisms, causing the models to produce harmful, restricted, or biased content. In this paper, we…

While address space layout randomization (ASLR) has been extensively studied for user-space programs, the corresponding OS kernel's KASLR support remains very limited, making the kernel vulnerable to just-in-time (JIT) return-oriented…

The escalating sophistication of Android malware poses significant challenges to traditional detection methods, necessitating innovative approaches that can efficiently identify and classify threats with high precision. This paper…

Current low-level exploits often rely on code-reuse, whereby short sections of code (gadgets) are chained together into a coherent exploit that can be executed without the need to inject any code. Several protection mechanisms attempt to…

Fine-grained Address Space Randomization has been considered as an effective protection against code reuse attacks such as ROP/JOP. However, it only employs a one-time randomization, and such a limitation has been exploited by recent…

Since its inception, Rowhammer exploits have rapidly evolved into increasingly sophisticated threats compromising data integrity and the control flow integrity of victim processes. Nevertheless, it remains a challenge for an attacker to…