相关论文: The Security Protocol Verifier ProVerif and its Ho…

We propose a methodology for verifying security properties of network protocols at design level. It can be separated in two main parts: context and requirements analysis and informal verification; and formal representation and procedural…

In the paper we introduce a process model of security protocols, where processes are graphs with edges labelled by actions, and present a new method of specification and verification of security protocols based on this model.

Validating wireless protocol implementations is challenging. Today's approaches require labor-intensive experimental setup and manual trace investigation, but produce poor coverage and inaccurate and irreproducible results. We present…

Security protocols are essential building blocks of modern IT systems. Subtle flaws in their design or implementation may compromise the security of entire systems. It is, thus, important to prove the absence of such flaws through formal…

Computer-aided analysis of security protocols heavily relies on equational theories to model cryptographic primitives. Most automated verifiers for security protocols focus on equational theories that satisfy the Finite Variant Property…

We present a method for verifying the correctness of imperative programs which is based on the automated transformation of their specifications. Given a program prog, we consider a partial correctness specification of the form $\{\varphi\}$…

In this paper, we propose a tool, called DataProVe, for specifying high-level data protection policies and system architectures, as well as verifying the conformance between them in a fully automated way. The syntax of the policies and the…

Many Program Verification and Synthesis problems of interest can be modeled directly using Horn clauses and many recent advances in the CLP and CAV communities have centered around efficiently solving problems presented as Horn clauses. The…

Automated security protocol verifiers such as ProVerif and Tamarin have been increasingly applied to verify large scale complex real-world protocols. While their ability to automate difficult reasoning processes required to handle protocols…

The verification of security protocols is essential, in order to ensure the absence of potential attacks. However, verification results are only valid with respect to the assumptions under which the verification was performed. These…

A long-standing research problem in security protocol design is how to efficiently verify security protocols with tamper-resistant global states. In this paper, we address this problem by first proposing a protocol specification framework,…

Automatically verifying safety properties of programs is hard, and it is even harder if the program acts upon arrays or other forms of maps. Many approaches exist for verifying programs operating upon Boolean and integer values (e.g.…

In this paper we present InterHorn, a solver for recursion-free Horn clauses. The main application domain of InterHorn lies in solving interpolation problems arising in software verification. We show how a range of interpolation problems,…

Most work on the formal verification of neural networks has focused on bounding the set of outputs that correspond to a given set of inputs (for example, bounded perturbations of a nominal input). However, many use cases of neural network…

Allowing a compromised device to receive privacy-sensitive sensor readings, or to operate a safety-critical actuator, carries significant risk. Usually, such risks are mitigated by validating the device's security state with remote…

We present a verification technique for program safety that combines Iterated Specialization and Interpolating Horn Clause Solving. Our new method composes together these two techniques in a modular way by exploiting the common Horn Clause…

In this paper, we consider the problem of verifying anonymity and unlinkability in the symbolic model, where protocols are represented as processes in a variant of the applied pi calculus, notably used in the ProVerif tool. Existing tools…

Security protocols are concurrent processes that communicate using cryptography with the aim of achieving various security properties. Recent work on their formal verification has brought procedures and tools for deciding trace equivalence…

Reliably knowing when a language model is correct is almost as important as being correct. We introduce prover-verifier deliberation (PVD), an inference-time protocol grounded in interactive proof theory, as a mechanism for selective…

Cryptographic protocols aim at securing communications over insecure networks such as the Internet, where dishonest users may listen to communications and interfere with them. A secure communication has a different meaning depending on the…