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Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) integrate sensing, communication, computation, and control to support critical infrastructure, including smart grids, industrial automation, and control systems. In the electrical utility domain, various…

Cyber-physical system (CPS) is the foundational backbone of modern critical infrastructures, so ensuring its security and resilience against cyber-attacks is of pivotal importance. This paper addresses the challenge of designing anomaly…

We study the problem of defending a Cyber-Physical System (CPS) consisting of interdependent components with heterogeneous sensitivity to investments. In addition to the optimal allocation of limited security resources, we analyze the…

An unobservable false data injection (FDI) attack on AC state estimation (SE) is introduced and its consequences on the physical system are studied. With a focus on understanding the physical consequences of FDI attacks, a bi-level…

Industrial control systems (ICSs) are widely used and vital to industry and society. Their failure can have severe impact on both economics and human life. Hence, these systems have become an attractive target for attacks, both physical and…

Stealthy false data injection attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPSs) introduce erroneous measurement information to on-board sensors with the purpose to degrade system performance. An intelligent attacker is able to leverage knowledge of…

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) encounter a large volume of data which is added to the system gradually in real time and not altogether in advance. As the volume of data increases, the domain of the control strategies also increases, and thus…

This paper introduces a novel two-stage framework for online mitigation of False Data Injection (FDI) signals to improve the resiliency of Networked Control Systems (NCSs) and ensure their safe operation in the presence of malicious…

The rapid evolution of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) across various domains like mobility systems, networked control systems, sustainable manufacturing, smart power grids, and the Internet of Things necessitates innovative solutions that…

Real-time cyber-physical systems depend on deterministic task execution to guarantee safety and correctness. Unfortunately, this determinism can unintentionally expose timing information that enables adversaries to infer task execution…

This paper addresses the problem of distributed resilient state estimation and control for linear time-invariant systems in the presence of malicious false data injection sensor attacks and bounded noise. We consider a system operator…

Modern Industrial Control Systems (ICS) attacks evade existing tools by using knowledge of ICS processes to blend their activities with benign Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) operation, causing physical world damages. We…

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are being increasingly utilized for critical applications. CPS combines sensing and computing elements, often having multi-layer designs with networking, computational, and physical interfaces, which provide…

There is an upward trend of deploying distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) to control modern power grids. However, DERMS controller communication lines are vulnerable to cyberattacks that could potentially impact…

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) incorporate the complex and large-scale engineered systems behind critical infrastructure operations, such as water distribution networks, energy delivery systems, healthcare services, manufacturing systems, and…

Cybersecurity in building energy management is crucial for protecting infrastructure, ensuring data integrity, and preventing unauthorized access or manipulation. This paper investigates the energy efficiency and cybersecurity of building…

This paper demonstrates that false data injection (FDI) attacks are extremely limited in their ability to cause physical consequences on $N-1$ reliable power systems operating with real-time contingency analysis (RTCA) and security…

This paper studies physical consequences of unobservable false data injection (FDI) attacks designed only with information inside a sub-network of the power system. The goal of this attack is to overload a chosen target line without being…

Securing cyber-physical systems (CPS) against malicious attacks is of paramount importance because these attacks may cause irreparable damages to physical systems. Recent studies have revealed that control programs running on CPS devices…

Over the past decade, industrial control systems have experienced a massive integration with information technologies. Industrial networks have undergone numerous technical transformations to protect operational and production processes,…