相关论文: Uncoupled Learning Dynamics with $O(\log T)$ Swap …

We examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in a continuous game with other optimizing agents: in this case, if all players follow a no-regret algorithm, it is possible to achieve significantly lower regret…

In a Stackelberg game, a leader commits to a randomized strategy, and a follower chooses their best strategy in response. We consider an extension of a standard Stackelberg game, called a discrete-time dynamic Stackelberg game, that has an…

We consider the problem of the Zinkevich (2003)-style dynamic regret minimization in online learning with exp-concave losses. We show that whenever improper learning is allowed, a Strongly Adaptive online learner achieves the dynamic regret…

We study online reinforcement learning in average-reward stochastic games (SGs). An SG models a two-player zero-sum game in a Markov environment, where state transitions and one-step payoffs are determined simultaneously by a learner and an…

Meta reinforcement learning sets a distribution over a set of tasks on which the agent can train at will, then is asked to learn an optimal policy for any test task efficiently. In this paper, we consider a finite set of tasks modeled…

We study the problem of minimizing gap-dependent regret for single-pass streaming stochastic multi-armed bandits (MAB). In this problem, the $n$ arms are present in a stream, and at most $m<n$ arms and their statistics can be stored in the…

We show that learning algorithms satisfying a $\textit{low approximate regret}$ property experience fast convergence to approximate optimality in a large class of repeated games. Our property, which simply requires that each learner has…

We introduce Cautious Optimism, a framework for substantially faster regularized learning in general games. Cautious Optimism, as a variant of Optimism, adaptively controls the learning pace in a dynamic, non-monotone manner to accelerate…

Characterizing the performance of no-regret dynamics in multi-player games is a foundational problem at the interface of online learning and game theory. Recent results have revealed that when all players adopt specific learning algorithms,…

In this paper, we study dynamic regret in unconstrained online convex optimization (OCO) with movement costs. Specifically, we generalize the standard setting by allowing the movement cost coefficients $\lambda_t$ to vary arbitrarily over…

We provide a novel reduction from swap-regret minimization to external-regret minimization, which improves upon the classical reductions of Blum-Mansour [BM07] and Stolz-Lugosi [SL05] in that it does not require finiteness of the space of…

The theory of reinforcement learning currently suffers from a mismatch between its empirical performance and the theoretical characterization of its performance, with consequences for, e.g., the understanding of sample efficiency, safety,…

We present a novel control-theoretic understanding of online optimization and learning in games, via the notion of passivity. Passivity is a fundamental concept in control theory, which abstracts energy conservation and dissipation in…

We study the problem of characterizing optimal learning algorithms for playing repeated games against an adversary with unknown payoffs. In this problem, the first player (called the learner) commits to a learning algorithm against a second…

We study online learning problems in which the learner has extra knowledge about the adversary's behaviour, i.e., in game-theoretic settings where opponents typically follow some no-external regret learning algorithms. Under this…

Policy regret is a well established notion of measuring the performance of an online learning algorithm against an adaptive adversary. We study restrictions on the adversary that enable efficient minimization of the \emph{complete policy…

We study a cooperative multi-agent bandit setting in the distributed GOSSIP model: in every round, each of $n$ agents chooses an action from a common set, observes the action's corresponding reward, and subsequently exchanges information…

An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility…

We show for the first time, to our knowledge, that it is possible to reconcile in online learning in zero-sum games two seemingly contradictory objectives: vanishing time-average regret and non-vanishing step sizes. This phenomenon, that we…

We design the first regret guarantees for robust dynamic pricing that decouple the dependence on the corruption $C$ and the time horizon $T$. In dynamic pricing, a seller with unlimited supply of a good interacts with a stream of buyers…