相关论文: SFIP: Coarse-Grained Syscall-Flow-Integrity Protec…

With the improvements in computing technologies, edge devices in the Internet-of-Things have become more complex. The enabler technology for these complex systems are powerful application core processors with operating system support, such…

Computing systems, including real-time embedded systems, are becoming increasingly connected to allow for more advanced and safer operation. Such embedded systems are resource-constrained, such as lower processing capabilities, as compared…

Memory corruption errors in C/C++ programs remain the most common source of security vulnerabilities in today's systems. Control-flow hijacking attacks exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities to divert program execution away from the…

Applications written in low-level languages without type or memory safety are especially prone to memory corruption. Attackers gain code execution capabilities through such applications despite all currently deployed defenses by exploiting…

Subverting the flow of instructions (e.g., by use of code-reuse attacks) still poses a serious threat to the security of today's systems. Various control flow integrity (CFI) schemes have been proposed as a powerful technique to detect and…

Modern RISC-V platforms control and monitor security-critical systems such as industrial controllers and autonomous vehicles. While these platforms feature a Root-of-Trust (RoT) to store authentication secrets and enable secure boot…

Recent Pwn2Own competitions have demonstrated the continued effectiveness of control hijacking attacks despite deployed countermeasures including stack canaries and ASLR. A powerful defense called Control flow Integrity (CFI) offers a…

CFI is a computer security technique that detects runtime attacks by monitoring a program's branching behavior. This work presents a detailed analysis of the security policies enforced by 21 recent hardware-based CFI architectures. The goal…

With the improvements of computing technology, more and more applications embed powerful ARM processors into their devices. These systems can be attacked by redirecting the control-flow of a program to bypass critical pieces of code such as…

Fault attacks enable adversaries to manipulate the control-flow of security-critical applications. By inducing targeted faults into the CPU, the software's call graph can be escaped and the control-flow can be redirected to arbitrary…

This paper presents an in-kernel, hardware-based control-flow integrity (CFI) protection, called PAL, that utilizes ARM's Pointer Authentication (PA). It provides three important benefits over commercial, state-of-the-art PA-based CFIs like…

Control-flow hijacking attacks are used to perform malicious com-putations. Current solutions for assessing the attack surface afteracontrol flow integrity(CFI) policy was applied can measure onlyindirect transfer averages in the best case…

Spectre attacks and their many subsequent variants are a new vulnerability class affecting modern CPUs. The attacks rely on the ability to misguide speculative execution, generally by exploiting the branch prediction structures, to execute…

Embedded devices in the Internet of Things (IoT) face a wide variety of security challenges. For example, software attackers perform code injection and code-reuse attacks on their remote interfaces, and physical access to IoT devices allows…

Fault injection (FI) is a powerful attack methodology allowing an adversary to entirely break the security of a target device. As finite-state machines (FSMs) are fundamental hardware building blocks responsible for controlling systems,…

Secure elements physically exposed to adversaries are frequently targeted by fault attacks. These attacks can be utilized to hijack the control-flow of software allowing the attacker to bypass security measures, extract sensitive data, or…

Compiler-based Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) offers strong forward-edge protection but remains challenging to deploy in large C/C++ software due to visibility mismatches, type inconsistencies, and unintended behavioral failures. We present…

Protecting programs against control-flow hijacking attacks recently has become an arms race between defenders and attackers. While certain defenses, e.g., \textit{Control Flow Integrity} (CFI), restrict the targets of indirect control-flow…

Rising device use and third-party IP integration in semiconductors raise security concerns. Unauthorized access, fault injection, and privacy invasion are potential threats from untrusted actors. Different security techniques have been…

Smart contracts are frequently vulnerable to control-flow attacks based on confused deputies, reentrancy, and incorrect error handling. These attacks exploit the complexity of interactions among multiple possibly unknown contracts. Existing…