相关论文: In-Kernel Control-Flow Integrity on Commodity OSes…

Secure elements physically exposed to adversaries are frequently targeted by fault attacks. These attacks can be utilized to hijack the control-flow of software allowing the attacker to bypass security measures, extract sensitive data, or…

In-process compartmentalization and access control have been actively explored to provide in-place and efficient isolation of in-process security domains. Many works have proposed compartmentalization schemes that leverage hardware…

Subverting the flow of instructions (e.g., by use of code-reuse attacks) still poses a serious threat to the security of today's systems. Various control flow integrity (CFI) schemes have been proposed as a powerful technique to detect and…

Spectre attacks and their many subsequent variants are a new vulnerability class affecting modern CPUs. The attacks rely on the ability to misguide speculative execution, generally by exploiting the branch prediction structures, to execute…

This paper provides a systematic exploration of Control Flow Integrity (CFI) and Control Flow Attestation (CFA) mechanisms, examining their differences and relationships. It addresses crucial questions about the goals, assumptions,…

The advent of Federated Learning (FL) as a distributed machine learning paradigm has introduced new cybersecurity challenges, notably adversarial attacks that threaten model integrity and participant privacy. This study proposes an…

Memory corruption vulnerabilities are still a severe threat for software systems. To thwart the exploitation of such vulnerabilities, many different kinds of defenses have been proposed in the past. Most prominently, Control-Flow Integrity…

Capability machines such as CHERI provide memory capabilities that can be used by compilers to provide security benefits for compiled code (e.g., memory safety). The existing C to CHERI compiler, for example, achieves memory safety by…

Control Flow Attestation (CFA) offers a means to detect control flow hijacking attacks on remote devices, enabling verification of their runtime trustworthiness. CFA generates a trace (CFLog) containing the destination of all branching…

Securing low-latency I/O in commodity systems forces a fundamental trade-off: rely on the kernel's high overhead mediated interface, or bypass it entirely, exposing sensitive hardware resources to userspace and creating new vulnerabilities.…

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allow the secure execution of code on remote systems without the need to trust their operators. They use static attestation as a central mechanism for establishing trust, allowing remote parties to…

Memory-safety violations in C and C++ programs continue to enable sophisticated exploitation techniques such as control-flow hijacking and data-oriented attacks. Existing hardware defenses either rely on address space layout randomization…

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) rely on sensor feedback to keep safety-critical processes within operational limits. This research presents a hardware-root-of-trust that embeds a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) at the measurement…

Fault injection (FI) is a powerful attack methodology allowing an adversary to entirely break the security of a target device. As finite-state machines (FSMs) are fundamental hardware building blocks responsible for controlling systems,…

Control-flow hijacking attacks are used to perform malicious com-putations. Current solutions for assessing the attack surface afteracontrol flow integrity(CFI) policy was applied can measure onlyindirect transfer averages in the best case…

Control flow integrity (CFI) has received significant attention in the community to combat control hijacking attacks in the presence of memory corruption vulnerabilities. The challenges in creating a practical CFI has resulted in the…

The design of tiny trust anchors has received significant attention over the past decade, to secure low-end MCU-s that cannot afford expensive security mechanisms. In particular, hardware/software (hybrid) co-designs offer low hardware…

Data-Flow Integrity (DFI) is a well-known approach to effectively detecting a wide range of software attacks. However, its real-world application has been quite limited so far because of the prohibitive performance overhead it incurs.…

Applications written in low-level languages without type or memory safety are especially prone to memory corruption. Attackers gain code execution capabilities through such applications despite all currently deployed defenses by exploiting…

Compiler-based Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) offers strong forward-edge protection but remains challenging to deploy in large C/C++ software due to visibility mismatches, type inconsistencies, and unintended behavioral failures. We present…