相关论文: SmashEx: Smashing SGX Enclaves Using Exceptions

Mitigating memory-access attacks on the Intel SGX architecture is an important and open research problem. A natural notion of the mitigation is cache-miss obliviousness which requires the cache-misses emitted during an enclave execution are…

Trusted execution environments (TEEs) are an integral part of modern secure processors. They ensure that their application and code pages are confidential, tamper proof and immune to diverse types of attacks. In 2021, Intel suddenly…

Forking attacks against TEEs like Intel SGX can be carried out either by rolling back the application to a previous state, or by cloning the application and by partitioning its inputs across the cloned instances. Current solutions to…

We explore the use of SGX enclaves as a means to improve the security of handling keys and data in storage systems. We study two main configurations for SGX computations, as they apply to performing data-at-rest encryption in a storage…

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), such as Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX), are increasingly being adopted to address trust and compliance issues in the public cloud. Intel SGX's second generation (SGXv2) addresses many…

This paper shows how an attacker can break the confidentiality of a hardware enclave with Membuster, an off-chip attack based on snooping the memory bus. An attacker with physical access can observe an unencrypted address bus and extract…

Intel SGX Guard eXtensions (SGX), a hardware-supported trusted execution environment (TEE), is designed to protect security-sensitive applications. However, since enclave applications are developed with memory unsafe languages such as…

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are gaining popularity as an effective means to provide confidentiality in the cloud. TEEs, such as Intel SGX, suffer from so-called rollback and cloning attacks (often referred to as forking attacks).…

Process-based confidential computing enclaves such as Intel SGX can be used to protect the confidentiality and integrity of workloads, without the overhead of virtualisation. However, they introduce a notable performance overhead,…

Cloud computing offers resource-constrained users big-volume data storage and energy-consuming complicated computation. However, owing to the lack of full trust in the cloud, the cloud users prefer privacy-preserving outsourced data…

Recent attacks have broken process isolation by exploiting microarchitectural side channels that allow indirect access to shared microarchitectural state. Enclaves strengthen the process abstraction to restore isolation guarantees. We…

Trusted Execution Environments, such as Intel SGX, use hardware supports to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of applications against a compromised cloud system. However, side channels like access patterns remain for adversaries to…

Enclaves have emerged as a particularly compelling primitive to implement trusted execution environments: strongly isolated sensitive user-mode processes in a largely untrusted software environment. While the threat models employed by…

New trusted computing primitives such as Intel SGX have shown the feasibility of running user-level applications in enclaves on a commodity trusted processor without trusting a large OS. However, the OS can still compromise the integrity of…

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allow user processes to create enclaves that protect security-sensitive computation against access from the OS kernel and the hypervisor. Recent work has shown that TEEs are vulnerable to side-channel…

Computer systems often provide hardware support for isolation mechanisms like privilege levels, virtual memory, or enclaved execution. Over the past years, several successful software-based side-channel attacks have been developed that…

Fault-injection attacks have been proven in the past to be a reliable way of bypassing hardware-based security measures, such as cryptographic hashes, privilege and access permission enforcement, and trusted execution environments. However,…

Novel confidential computing technologies such as Intel TDX, AMD SEV, and Arm CCA have recently emerged. In practice, due to its minimal trust boundaries, Intel SGX still remains widely used for enclave-based applications in cloud…

Browsers, Library OSes, and system emulators rely on sandboxes and in-process isolation to emulate system resources and securely isolate untrusted components. All access to system resources like system calls (syscall) need to be securely…

Adversaries with physical access to a target platform can perform cold boot or DMA attacks to extract sensitive data from the RAM. In response, several main-memory encryption schemes have been proposed to prevent such attacks. Also hardware…