相关论文: Game theory on the blockchain: a model for games w…

We identify a subtle security issue that impacts mechanism design in scenarios in which agents can absolutely commit to strategies. Absolute commitments allow the strategy of an agent to depend on the commitments made by the other agents.…

We identify a subtle security issue that impacts the design of smart contracts, because agents may themselves deploy smart contracts (side contracts). Typically, equilibria of games are analyzed in vitro, under the assumption that players…

Blockchain-based smart contracts offer a new take on credible commitment, where players can commit to actions in reaction to actions of others. Such reaction-function games extend on strategic games with players choosing reaction functions…

The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's…

Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…

In security games, the solution concept commonly used is that of a Stackelberg equilibrium where the defender gets to commit to a mixed strategy. The motivation for this is that the attacker can repeatedly observe the defender's actions and…

Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. As opposed to the weak Stackelberg equilibrium (WSE), the SSE assumes that the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader and this is…

Cooperation is fundamental for human prosperity. Blockchain, as a trust machine, is a cooperative institution in cyberspace that supports cooperation through distributed trust with consensus protocols. While studies in computer science…

We study $n$-player turn-based games played on a finite directed graph. For each play, the players have to pay a cost that they want to minimize. Instead of the well-known notion of Nash equilibrium (NE), we focus on the notion of subgame…

Cloud computing has become an irreversible trend. Together comes the pressing need for verifiability, to assure the client the correctness of computation outsourced to the cloud. Existing verifiable computation techniques all have a high…

Blockchains rely on economic incentives to ensure secure and decentralised operation, making incentive compatibility a core design concern. However, protocols are rarely deployed in isolation. Applications interact with the underlying…

We study the computational complexity of finding Stackelberg Equilibria in general-sum games, where the set of pure strategies of the leader and the followers are exponentially large in a natrual representation of the problem. In…

This paper studies a three party energy management problem in a user interactive smart community that consists of a large number of residential units (RUs) with distributed energy resources (DERs), a shared facility controller (SFC) and the…

We study a decentralized matching market in which firms sequentially make offers to potential workers. For each offer, the worker can choose "accept" or "reject," but the decision is irrevocable. The acceptance of an offer guarantees her…

Many of the problems that arise in the context of blockchains and decentralized finance can be seen as variations on classical problems of distributed computing. The smart contract model proposed here is intended to capture both the…

Despite the popularity and practical applicability of blockchains, there is very limited work on the theoretical foundation of blockchains: The lack of rigorous theory and analysis behind the curtain of blockchains has severely staggered…

Blockchains have sparked global interest in recent years, gaining importance as they increasingly influence technology and finance. This thesis investigates the robustness of blockchain protocols, specifically focusing on Ethereum…

We study a Stackelberg game to examine how two agents determine to cooperate while competing with each other. Each selects an arrival time to a destination, the earlier one fetching a higher reward. There is, however, an inherent penalty in…

As the core issue of blockchain, the mining requires solving a proof-of-work puzzle, which is resource expensive to implement in mobile devices due to high computing power needed. Thus, the development of blockchain in mobile applications…