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相关论文: Reward Mechanism for Blockchains Using Evolutionar…

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We introduce and study reward sharing schemes (RSS) that promote the fair formation of {\em stake pools}\ in collaborative projects that involve a large number of stakeholders such as the maintenance of a proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain.…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2020-06-09 Lars Brünjes , Aggelos Kiayias , Elias Koutsoupias , Aikaterini-Panagiota Stouka

The current surge in supply chain finance has significantly alleviated the "capital challenges" faced by domestic related enterprises, enabling enterprises upstream and subsequent stages of the industrial chain to achieve effective…

社会与信息网络 · 计算机科学 2025-11-11 Linwei Wu

We study Nash-dynamics in the context of blockchain protocols. We introduce a formal model, within which one can assess whether the Nash dynamics can lead utility-maximizing participants to defect from the "honest" protocol operation,…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2022-03-24 Dimitris Karakostas , Aggelos Kiayias , Thomas Zacharias

This paper proposes a new paradigm: generative blockchain, which aims to transform conventional blockchain technology by combining transaction generation and recording, rather than focusing solely on transaction recording. Central to our…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2024-08-27 Haozhao Zhang , Zhe Zhang , Zhiqiang Zheng , Varghese Jacob

This paper proposes a conceptual framework for the analysis of reward sharing schemes in mining pools, such as those associated with Bitcoin. The framework is centered around the reported shares in a pool instead of agents and results in…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2021-07-13 Burak Can , Jens Leth Hougaard , Mohsen Pourpouneh

Following the publication of Bitcoin's arguably most famous attack, selfish mining, various works have introduced mechanisms to enhance blockchain systems' game theoretic resilience. Some reward mechanisms, like FruitChains, have been shown…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-03-14 Lukas Aumayr , Zeta Avarikioti , Dimitris Karakostas , Karl Kreder , Shreekara Shastry

Ethereum 2.0, as the preeminent smart contract blockchain platform, guarantees the precise execution of applications without third-party intervention. At its core, this system leverages the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus mechanism, which…

综合经济学 · 经济学 2025-08-11 Tao Yan , Shengnan Li , Benjamin Kraner , Luyao Zhang , Claudio J. Tessone

In this paper, we investigate the impact of reward schemes and committee sizes motivated by governance systems over blockchain communities. We introduce a model for elections with a binary outcome space where there is a ground truth (i.e.,…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-08-01 Georgios Birmpas , Philip Lazos , Evangelos Markakis , Paolo Penna

To maintain blockchain-based services with ensuring its security, it is an important issue how to decide a mining reward so that the number of miners participating in the mining increases. We propose a dynamical model of decision-making for…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2022-04-13 Kosuke Toda , Naomi Kuze , Toshimitsu Ushio

Algorand is a recent, open-source public or permissionless blockchain system that employs a novel proof-of-stake byzantine consensus protocol to efficiently scale the distributed transaction agreement problem to billions of users. In…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2019-11-11 Mehdi Fooladgar , Mohammad Hossein Manshaei , Murtuza Jadliwala , Mohammad Ashiqur Rahman

Blockchain consensus is a state whereby each node in a network agrees on the current state of the blockchain. Existing protocols achieve consensus via a contest or voting procedure to select one node as a dictator to propose new blocks.…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2022-06-22 Joshua S. Gans , Richard Holden

This paper examines the economic and security implications of Proof-of-Stake (POS) designs, providing a survey of POS design choices and their underlying economic principles in prominent POS-blockchains. The paper argues that…

综合经济学 · 经济学 2024-05-24 Nicolas Oderbolz , Beatrix Marosvölgyi , Matthias Hafner

A blockchain faces two fundamental challenges. It must motivate users to maintain the system while preventing a minority of these users from colluding and gaining disproportionate control. Many popular public blockchains use monetary…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2021-10-15 Shea Ketsdever , Michael J. Fischer

Proof-of-Work is a consensus algorithm where miners solve cryptographic puzzles to mine blocks and obtain a reward through some Block Reward Mechanism (BRM). PoW blockchain faces the problem of centralization due to the formation of mining…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-01-18 Varul Srivastava , Sujit Gujar

Most concurrent blockchain systems rely heavily on the Proof-of-Work (PoW) or Proof-of-Stake (PoS) mechanisms for decentralized consensus and security assurance. However, the substantial energy expenditure stemming from computationally…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2026-05-05 Zishuo Zhao , Zhixuan Fang , Xuechao Wang , Xi Chen , Hongxu Su , Haibo Xiao , Yuan Zhou

We study a game-theoretic model for pool formation in Proof of Stake blockchain protocols. In such systems, stakeholders can form pools as a means of obtaining regular rewards from participation in ledger maintenance, with the power of each…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-06-09 Aggelos Kiayias , Elias Koutsoupias , Evangelos Markakis , Panagiotis Tsamopoulos

Public blockchains, though renowned for their transparency and immutability, suffer from significant privacy concerns. Network-level analysis and long-term observation of publicly available transactions can often be used to infer user…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2026-01-19 Boutaina Jebari , Khalil Ibrahimi , Hamidou Tembine , Mounir Ghogho

Blockchain technology has become a trusted method for establishing secure and transparent transactions through a distributed, encrypted network. The operation of blockchain is governed by consensus algorithms, among which Proof of Stake…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2024-06-03 Bruno Ramos-Cruz , Javier Andreu-Pérez , Francisco J. Quesada , Luis Martínez

Proof-of-Stake blockchains based on a longest-chain consensus protocol are an attractive energy-friendly alternative to the Proof-of-Work paradigm. However, formal barriers to "getting the incentives right" were recently discovered, driven…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-10-31 Matheus V. X. Ferreira , S. Matthew Weinberg

Game theory is often used as a tool to analyze decentralized systems and their properties, in particular, blockchains. In this note, we take the opposite view. We argue that blockchains can and should be used to implement economic…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2020-10-02 Akaki Mamageishvili , Jan Christoph Schlegel