相关论文: Adversarial Regularization as Stackelberg Game: An…

In increasingly different contexts, it happens that a human player has to interact with artificial players who make decisions following decision-making algorithms. How should the human player play against these algorithms to maximize his…

Adversarial attacks and robustness in Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) have been widely studied in various threat models; however, few consider environmental state perturbations, which are natural in embodied scenarios. To improve the…

Artificially intelligent agents equipped with strategic skills that can negotiate during their interactions with other natural or artificial agents are still underdeveloped. This paper describes a successful application of Deep…

We study a two-player Stackelberg game with incomplete information such that the follower's strategy belongs to a known family of parameterized functions with an unknown parameter vector. We design an adaptive learning approach to…

Adversarial training (AT) is a regularization method that can be used to improve the robustness of neural network methods by adding small perturbations in the training data. We show how to use AT for the tasks of entity recognition and…

Artificially intelligent agents are increasingly being integrated into human decision-making: from large language model (LLM) assistants to autonomous vehicles. These systems often optimize their individual objective, leading to conflicts,…

We propose a Regularization framework based on Adversarial Transformations (RAT) for semi-supervised learning. RAT is designed to enhance robustness of the output distribution of class prediction for a given data against input perturbation.…

The vulnerability of deep neural network models to adversarial example attacks is a practical challenge in many artificial intelligence applications. A recent line of work shows that the use of randomization in adversarial training is the…

Stackelberg games are a classic example of bilevel optimization problems, which are often encountered in game theory and economics. These are complex problems with a hierarchical structure, where one optimization task is nested within the…

While great progress has been made at making neural networks effective across a wide range of visual tasks, most models are surprisingly vulnerable. This frailness takes the form of small, carefully chosen perturbations of their input,…

Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…

The $1-N$ generalized Stackelberg game (single-leader multi-follower game) is intricately intertwined with the interaction between a leader and followers (hierarchical interaction) and the interaction among followers (simultaneous…

A deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agent observes its states through observations, which may contain natural measurement errors or adversarial noises. Since the observations deviate from the true states, they can mislead the agent into…

Machine learning relies on the assumption that unseen test instances of a classification problem follow the same distribution as observed training data. However, this principle can break down when machine learning is used to make important…

We propose an adversarial deep reinforcement learning (ADRL) algorithm for high-dimensional stochastic control problems. Inspired by the information relaxation duality, ADRL reformulates the control problem as a min-max optimization between…

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept in two-player games where the leader has commitment rights over the follower. In recent years, it has become a cornerstone of many security applications, including airport patrolling and…

We present a novel framework for online learning in Stackelberg general-sum games, where two agents, the leader and follower, engage in sequential turn-based interactions. At the core of this approach is a learned diffeomorphism that maps…

The vulnerability of Deep Neural Networks to Adversarial Attacks has fuelled research towards building robust models. While most Adversarial Training algorithms aim at defending attacks constrained within low magnitude Lp norm bounds,…

The vulnerability of neural network classifiers to adversarial attacks is a major obstacle to their deployment in safety-critical applications. Regularization of network parameters during training can be used to improve adversarial…

Stackelberg games originate where there are market leaders and followers, and the actions of leaders influence the behavior of the followers. Mathematical modelling of such games results in what's called a Bilevel Optimization problem.…