相关论文: Detecting corruption in single-bidder auctions via…

Discrimination can occur when the underlying unbiased labels are overwritten by an agent with potential bias, resulting in biased datasets that unfairly harm specific groups and cause classifiers to inherit these biases. In this paper, we…

Traditionally, the Bayesian optimal auction design problem has been considered either when the bidder values are i.i.d., or when each bidder is individually identifiable via her value distribution. The latter is a reasonable approach when…

We study the problem of auditing the fairness of a given classifier under partial feedback, where true labels are available only for positively classified individuals, (e.g., loan repayment outcomes are observed only for approved…

The problem of market clearing is to set a price for an item such that quantity demanded equals quantity supplied. In this work, we cast the problem of predicting clearing prices into a learning framework and use the resulting models to…

Pretext Invariant Representation Learning (PIRL) followed by Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) has become a standard paradigm for learning with limited labels. We extend this approach to the Positive Unlabeled (PU) setting, where only a small…

We propose a new method of learning from positive and unlabeled (PU) examples in highly imbalanced datasets. Many real-world problems, such as disease gene identification, targeted marketing, fraud detection, and recommender systems, are…

We study a class of manipulations in combinatorial auctions where bidders fundamentally misrepresent what goods they are interested in. Prior work has largely assumed that bidders only submit bids on their bundles of interest, which we call…

Assessing the performance of a learned model is a crucial part of machine learning. However, in some domains only positive and unlabeled examples are available, which prohibits the use of most standard evaluation metrics. We propose an…

When society maintains a competitive system to promote an abstract goal, competition by necessity relies on imperfect proxy measures. For instance profit is used to measure value to consumers, patient volumes to measure hospital…

We study markets where firms compete for consumer attention by subsidizing costly product inspection. These subsidies do not change product quality, but they alter the order in which consumers search by lowering inspection costs. We…

Institutions are increasingly relying on machine learning models to identify and alert on abnormal events, such as fraud, cyber attacks and system failures. These alerts often need to be manually investigated by specialists. Given the…

Existing auto-bidding algorithms in digital advertising often treat the value of an ad opportunity as the revenue obtained when an ad is shown and/or clicked, and bid accordingly. This can lead to wasteful spending because the true value is…

We introduce a new numerical framework to learn optimal bidding strategies in repeated auctions when the seller uses past bids to optimize her mechanism. Crucially, we do not assume that the bidders know what optimization mechanism is used…

Malicious bots make up about a quarter of all traffic on the web, and degrade the performance of personalization and recommendation algorithms that operate on e-commerce sites. Positive-Unlabeled learning (PU learning) provides the ability…

We consider the fundamental problem of designing a truthful single-item auction with the challenging objective of extracting a large fraction of the highest agent valuation as revenue. Following a recent trend in algorithm design, we assume…

We study the question of setting and testing reserve prices in single item auctions when the bidders are not identical. At a high level, there are two generalizations of the standard second price auction: in the lazy version we first…

Buyers (e.g., advertisers) often have limited financial and processing resources, and so their participation in auctions is throttled. Changes to auctions may affect bids or throttling and any change may affect what winners pay. This paper…

We consider a problem of learning a binary classifier only from positive data and unlabeled data (PU learning) and estimating the class-prior in unlabeled data under the case-control scenario. Most of the recent methods of PU learning…

Existing auction mechanisms are vulnerable to bidder collusion, which substantially degrades revenue and non-colluder welfare. To design truthful mechanisms resilient to collusion, we introduce a novel approach that leverages a machine…

In this paper, we investigate the problem about how to bid in repeated contextual first price auctions. We consider a single bidder (learner) who repeatedly bids in the first price auctions: at each time $t$, the learner observes a context…