相关论文: Side-Channel Trojan Insertion -- a Practical Found…

Design and manufacturing of integrated circuits predominantly use a globally distributed semiconductor supply chain involving diverse entities. The modern semiconductor supply chain has been designed to boost production efficiency, but is…

The confidentiality of trained AI models on edge devices is at risk from side-channel attacks exploiting power and electromagnetic emissions. This paper proposes a novel training methodology to enhance resilience against such threats by…

To meet the ever-growing need for performance in silicon devices, SoC providers have been increasingly relying on software-hardware cooperation. By controlling hardware resources such as power or clock management from the software,…

This report investigates the potential impact of a Trojan attack on power conversion circuits, specifically a switching signal attack designed to trigger a locking of the pulse width modulation (PWM) signal that goes to a power field-effect…

A globally distributed IC supply chain brings risks due to untrusted third parties. The risks span inadvertent use of hardware Trojan (HT), inserted Intellectual Property (3P-IP) or Electronic Design Automation (EDA) flows. HT can introduce…

With the rising popularity of machine learning and the ever increasing demand for computational power, there is a growing need for hardware optimized implementations of neural networks and other machine learning models. As the technology…

Secure elements physically exposed to adversaries are frequently targeted by fault attacks. These attacks can be utilized to hijack the control-flow of software allowing the attacker to bypass security measures, extract sensitive data, or…

Neural network (NN) trojaning attack is an emerging and important attack model that can broadly damage the system deployed with NN models. Existing studies have explored the outsourced training attack scenario and transfer learning attack…

As part of the revelations about the NSA activities, the notion of interdiction has become known to the public: the interception of deliveries to manipulate hardware in a way that backdoors are introduced. Manipulations can occur on the…

Consumer and defense systems demanded design and manufacturing of electronics with increased performance, compared to their predecessors. As such systems became ubiquitous in a plethora of domains, their application surface increased, thus…

Security is an important facet of integrated circuit design for many applications. IP privacy and Trojan insertion are growing threats as circuit fabrication in advanced nodes almost inevitably relies on untrusted foundries. A proposed…

With the widespread use of deep neural networks (DNNs) in high-stake applications, the security problem of the DNN models has received extensive attention. In this paper, we investigate a specific security problem called trojan attack,…

Current Hardware Trojan (HT) detection techniques are mostly developed based on a limited set of HT benchmarks. Existing HT benchmark circuits are generated with multiple shortcomings, i.e., i) they are heavily biased by the designers'…

Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications in digital designs that can be inserted by untrusted supply chain entities. Hardware Trojans can give rise to diverse attack vectors such as information leakage (e.g. MOLES Trojan) and…

Increasing design complexity and reduced time-to-market have motivated manufacturers to outsource some parts of the System-on-Chip (SoC) design flow to third-party vendors. This provides an opportunity for attackers to introduce hardware…

Fault-tolerant routing (FTR) in Networks-on-Chip (NoCs) has become a common practice to sustain the performance of multi-core systems with an increasing number of faults on a chip. On the other hand, usage of third-party intellectual…

Power side-channel attacks are a very effective cryptanalysis technique that can infer secret keys of security ICs by monitoring the power consumption. Since the emergence of practical attacks in the late 90s, they have been a major threat…

Side-channel attacks on microprocessors, like the RISC-V, exhibit security vulnerabilities that lead to several design challenges. Hence, it is imperative to study and analyze these security vulnerabilities comprehensively. In this paper,…

Side-channel attacks that leak sensitive information through a computing device's interaction with its physical environment have proven to be a severe threat to devices' security, particularly when adversaries have unfettered physical…

Physical side-channel attacks can compromise the security of integrated circuits. Most physical side-channel attacks (e.g., power or electromagnetic) exploit the dynamic behavior of a chip, typically manifesting as changes in current…