相关论文: A Survey of Published Attacks on Intel SGX

Trusted execution environments (TEEs) are an integral part of modern secure processors. They ensure that their application and code pages are confidential, tamper proof and immune to diverse types of attacks. In 2021, Intel suddenly…

This paper presents SgxPectre Attacks that exploit the recently disclosed CPU bugs to subvert the confidentiality and integrity of SGX enclaves. Particularly, we show that when branch prediction of the enclave code can be influenced by…

Content-based routing (CBR) is a powerful model that supports scalable asynchronous communication among large sets of geographically distributed nodes. Yet, preserving privacy represents a major limitation for the wide adoption of CBR,…

The growth of cloud computing has revolutionized data processing and storage capacities to another levels of scalability and flexibility. But in the process, it has created a huge challenge of security, especially in terms of safeguarding…

Intel SGX and hypervisors isolate non-privileged programs from other software, ensuring confidentiality and integrity. However, side-channel attacks continue to threaten Intel SGX's security, enabling malicious OS to manipulate PTE present…

Trusted execution environments (TEEs) such as \intelsgx facilitate the secure execution of an application on untrusted machines. Sadly, such environments suffer from serious limitations and performance overheads in terms of writing back…

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone, provide isolated regions of CPU and memory for secure computation and are increasingly used to protect sensitive data and code across diverse application domains.…

Modern processors can offer hardware primitives that allow a process to run in isolation. These primitives implement a trusted execution environment (TEE) in which a program can run such that the integrity and confidentiality of its…

We introduce a new timing side-channel attack on Intel CPU processors. Our Frontal attack exploits timing differences that arise from how the CPU frontend fetches and processes instructions while being interrupted. In particular, we observe…

Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) is a new architectural extension in the 4th Generation Intel Xeon Scalable Processor that supports confidential computing. TDX allows the deployment of virtual machines in the Secure-Arbitration Mode…

As an emerging technique for confidential computing, trusted execution environment (TEE) receives a lot of attention. To better develop, deploy, and run secure applications on a TEE platform such as Intel's SGX, both academic and industrial…

In this paper, we explore a new, yet critical, side-channel attack against Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX), called a branch shadowing attack, which can reveal fine-grained control flows (i.e., each branch) of an enclave program running…

Recent research has demonstrated that Intel's SGX is vulnerable to software-based side-channel attacks. In a common attack, the adversary monitors CPU caches to infer secret-dependent data accesses patterns. Known defenses have major…

Recently, cloud control systems have gained increasing attention from the research community as a solution to implement networked cyber-physical systems (CPSs). Such an architecture can reduce deployment and maintenance costs albeit at the…

User programs recover from hardware exceptions and respond to signals by executing custom handlers that they register specifically for such events. We present SIGY attack, which abuses this programming model on Intel SGX to break the…

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), such as Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX), are considered as a promising approach to resolve security challenges in clouds. TEEs protect the confidentiality and integrity of application code and…

The Internet of Things (IoT) field has gained much attention from industry and academia, being the main subject for numerous research and development projects. Frequently, the dense amount of generated data from IoT applications is sent to…

Intel software guard extensions (SGX) aims to provide an isolated execution environment, known as an enclave, for a user-level process to maximize its confidentiality and integrity. In this paper, we study how uninitialized data inside a…

Side-channel information leakage is a known limitation of SGX. Researchers have demonstrated that secret-dependent information can be extracted from enclave execution through page-fault access patterns. Consequently, various recent research…

Hardware-supported security mechanisms like Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provide strong security guarantees, which are particularly relevant in cloud settings. However, their reliance on physical hardware conflicts with cloud…