相关论文: Verifying Accountability for Unbounded Sets of Par…

Accountability is a recent paradigm in security protocol design which aims to eliminate traditional trust assumptions on parties and hold them accountable for their misbehavior. It is meant to establish trust in the first place and to…

We provide a framework consisting of tools and metatheorems for the end-to-end verification of security protocols, which bridges the gap between automated protocol verification and code-level proofs. We automatically translate a Tamarin…

Security is critical for everything relying on modern digital systems. Because almost all digital interactions are governed by the Internet and cryptographic protocols, these protocols must serve as reliable mechanisms that guarantee core…

Formal verification is a critical process in ensuring the security and correctness of cryptographic protocols, particularly in high-assurance domains. This paper presents a comprehensive formal analysis of the Permission Voucher Protocol, a…

There exists a verification gap between formal protocol specifications and their actual implementations, which this work aims to bridge via monitoring for compliance to the formal specification. We instrument the networking and…

The internet is a major distribution platform for web applications, but there are no effective transparency and audit mechanisms in place for the web. Due to the ephemeral nature of web applications, a client visiting a website has no…

Monitorability delineates what properties can be verified at runtime. Although many monitorability definitions exist, few are defined explicitly in terms of the guarantees provided by monitors, i.e., the computational entities carrying out…

Verification is the process of checking whether a product has been implemented according to its prescribed specifications. We study the case of a designer (the developer) that needs to verify its design by a third party (the verifier), by…

As software becomes more complex and assumes an even greater role in our lives, formal verification is set to become the gold standard in securing software systems into the future, since it can guarantee the absence of errors and entire…

The design and verification of cryptographic protocols is a notoriously difficult task, even in symbolic models which take an abstract view of cryptography. This is mainly due to the fact that protocols may interact with an arbitrary…

Software Model Checkers have shown outstanding performance improvements in recent times. Moreover, for specific use cases, formal verification techniques have shown to be highly effective, leading to a number of high-profile success…

Cryptographic protocols aim at securing communications over insecure networks such as the Internet, where dishonest users may listen to communications and interfere with them. A secure communication has a different meaning depending on the…

Automated security protocol verifiers such as ProVerif and Tamarin have been increasingly applied to verify large scale complex real-world protocols. While their ability to automate difficult reasoning processes required to handle protocols…

In this paper, we consider the problem of verifying anonymity and unlinkability in the symbolic model, where protocols are represented as processes in a variant of the applied pi calculus, notably used in the ProVerif tool. Existing tools…

Motivated by proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchains such as Ethereum, two key desiderata have recently been studied for Byzantine-fault tolerant (BFT) state-machine replication (SMR) consensus protocols: Finality means that the protocol retains…

Quantum mechanics offers the possibility of unconditionally secure communication between multiple remote parties. Security proofs for such protocols typically rely on bounding the capacity of the quantum channel in use. In a similar manner,…

In the symbolic verification of cryptographic protocols, a central problem is deciding whether a protocol admits an execution which leaks a designated secret to the malicious intruder. Rusinowitch & Turuani (2003) show that, when…

Context: The complexity of modern safety-critical systems in industries keep on increasing due to the rising number of features and functionalities. This calls for formal methods in order to entrust confidence in such systems. Nevertheless,…

We propose a methodology for verifying security properties of network protocols at design level. It can be separated in two main parts: context and requirements analysis and informal verification; and formal representation and procedural…

Diffie-Hellman groups are commonly used in cryptographic protocols. While most state-of-the-art, symbolic protocol verifiers support them to some degree, they do not support all mathematical operations possible in these groups. In…