相关论文: Towards Memory Safe Python Enclave for Security Se…

Rust is a popular memory-safe systems programming language. In order to interact with hardware or call into non-Rust libraries, Rust provides \emph{unsafe} language features that shift responsibility for ensuring memory safety to the…

A protocol for two-party secure function evaluation (2P-SFE) aims to allow the parties to learn the output of function $f$ of their private inputs, while leaking nothing more. In a sense, such a protocol realizes a trusted oracle that…

Intel software guard extensions (SGX) aims to provide an isolated execution environment, known as an enclave, for a user-level process to maximize its confidentiality and integrity. In this paper, we study how uninitialized data inside a…

In modern computer systems, user processes are isolated from each other by the operating system and the hardware. Additionally, in a cloud scenario it is crucial that the hypervisor isolates tenants from other tenants that are co-located on…

Intel's software guard extensions (SGX) provide hardware enclaves to guarantee confidentiality and integrity for sensitive code and data. However, systems leveraging such security mechanisms must often pay high performance overheads. A…

Intel SGX is known to be vulnerable to a class of practical attacks exploiting memory access pattern side-channels, notably page-fault attacks and cache timing attacks. A promising hardening scheme is to wrap applications in hardware…

Machine learning has become a critical component of modern data-driven online services. Typically, the training phase of machine learning techniques requires to process large-scale datasets which may contain private and sensitive…

A trusted execution environment (TEE) such as Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) runs a remote attestation to prove to a data owner the integrity of the initial state of an enclave, including the program to operate on her data. For this…

Integrity is critical for maintaining system security, as it ensures that only genuine software is loaded onto a machine. Although confidential virtual machines (CVMs) function within isolated environments separate from the host, it is…

We present \texttt{secml}, an open-source Python library for secure and explainable machine learning. It implements the most popular attacks against machine learning, including test-time evasion attacks to generate adversarial examples…

User programs recover from hardware exceptions and respond to signals by executing custom handlers that they register specifically for such events. We present SIGY attack, which abuses this programming model on Intel SGX to break the…

This paper presents SgxPectre Attacks that exploit the recently disclosed CPU bugs to subvert the confidentiality and integrity of SGX enclaves. Particularly, we show that when branch prediction of the enclave code can be influenced by…

Hardware-supported security mechanisms like Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provide strong security guarantees, which are particularly relevant in cloud settings. However, their reliance on physical hardware conflicts with cloud…

New types of Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) architectures like TrustLite and Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) are emerging. They bring new features that can lead to innovative security and privacy solutions. But each new TEE…

Intel SGX enables memory isolation and static integrity verification of code and data stored in user-space memory regions called enclaves. SGX effectively shields the execution of enclaves from the underlying untrusted OS. Attackers cannot…

Trusted execution environments (TEEs) such as \intelsgx facilitate the secure execution of an application on untrusted machines. Sadly, such environments suffer from serious limitations and performance overheads in terms of writing back…

This paper presents PUBSUB-SGX, a content-based publish-subscribe system that exploits trusted execution environments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX, to guarantee confidentiality and integrity of data as well as anonymity and privacy of…

Enclaves have emerged as a particularly compelling primitive to implement trusted execution environments: strongly isolated sensitive user-mode processes in a largely untrusted software environment. While the threat models employed by…

Recent research has demonstrated that Intel's SGX is vulnerable to software-based side-channel attacks. In a common attack, the adversary monitors CPU caches to infer secret-dependent data accesses patterns. Known defenses have major…

Exceptions are a commodity hardware functionality which is central to multi-tasking OSes as well as event-driven user applications. Normally, the OS assists the user application by lifting the semantics of exceptions received from hardware…