相关论文: POWER-SUPPLaY: Leaking Data from Air-Gapped System…

Air-gapped computers are disconnected from the Internet physically and logically. This measure is taken in order to prevent the leakage of sensitive data from secured networks. In the past, it has been shown that malware can exfiltrate data…

Because computers may contain or interact with sensitive information, they are often air-gapped and in this way kept isolated and disconnected from the Internet. In recent years the ability of malware to communicate over an air-gap by…

Air-gapped systems are disconnected from the Internet and other networks because they contain or process sensitive data. However, it is known that attackers can use computer speakers to leak data via sound to circumvent the air-gap defense.…

In this paper, we show that attackers can exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers via Wi-Fi signals. Malware in a compromised air-gapped computer can generate signals in the Wi-Fi frequency bands. The signals are generated through the…

It is known that malware can leak data from isolated, air-gapped computers to nearby smartphones using ultrasonic waves. However, this covert channel requires access to the smartphone's microphone, which is highly protected in Android OS…

Air-gapped systems are physically separated from external networks, including the Internet. This isolation is achieved by keeping the air-gap computers disconnected from wired or wireless networks, preventing direct or remote communication…

In this paper we provide an implementation, evaluation, and analysis of PowerHammer, a malware (bridgeware [1]) that uses power lines to exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers. In this case, a malicious code running on a compromised…

In this paper we show how two (or more) airgapped computers in the same room, equipped with passive speakers, headphones, or earphones can covertly exchange data via ultrasonic waves. Microphones are not required. Our method is based on the…

It is possible to manipulate the headphones (or earphones) connected to a computer, silently turning them into a pair of eavesdropping microphones - with software alone. The same is also true for some types of loudspeakers. This paper…

In this paper we show how attackers can covertly leak data (e.g., encryption keys, passwords and files) from highly secure or air-gapped networks via the row of status LEDs that exists in networking equipment such as LAN switches and…

Air-gapped computers are systems that are kept isolated from the Internet since they store or process sensitive information. In this paper, we introduce an optical covert channel in which an attacker can leak (or, exfiltlrate) sensitive…

Air-gap covert channels are special types of covert communication channels that enable attackers to exfiltrate data from isolated, network-less computers. Various types of air-gap covert channels have been demonstrated over the years,…

New security and privacy concerns arise due to the growing popularity of voice assistant (VA) deployments in home and enterprise networks. A number of past research results have demonstrated how malicious actors can use hidden commands to…

Physical isolation, so called air-gapping, is an effective method for protecting security-critical computers and networks. While it might be possible to introduce malicious code through the supply chain, insider attacks, or social…

Air-gapped networks are wired with Ethernet cables since wireless connections are strictly prohibited. In this paper we present LANTENNA - a new type of electromagnetic attack allowing adversaries to leak sensitive data from isolated,…

In this paper, we show that attackers can leak data from isolated, air-gapped computers to nearby smartphones via covert magnetic signals. The proposed covert channel works even if a smartphone is kept inside a Faraday shielding case, which…

Air-gapped systems are isolated from the Internet due to the sensitive information they handle. This paper presents COVID-bit, a new COVert channel attack that leaks sensitive information over the air from highly isolated systems. The…

Air-gapped systems are considered highly secure against data leaks due to their physical isolation from external networks. Despite this protection, ultrasonic communication has been demonstrated as an effective method for exfiltrating data…

It has been assumed that the physical separation (air-gap) of computers provides a reliable level of security, such that should two adjacent computers become compromised, the covert exchange of data between them would be impossible. In this…

Physical isolation from external networks - an airgap - aims to minimize exposure to remote attacks. Yet capable adversaries still achieve code execution on air-gapped systems, and prior work has shown that they can then wirelessly…