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For the formal verification of a network security policy, it is crucial to express the verification goals. These formal goals, called security invariants, should be easy to express for the end user. Focusing on access control and…

In this paper, we propose the use of interactive theorem proving for explainable machine learning. After presenting our proposition, we illustrate it on the dedicated application of explaining security attacks using the Isabelle…

Evaluating the security of cyber-physical systems throughout their life cycle is necessary to assure that they can be deployed and operated in safety-critical applications, such as infrastructure, military, and transportation. Most safety…

The sophistication and complexity of cyber attacks and the variety of targeted platforms have been growing in recent years. Various adversaries are abusing an increasing range of platforms, e.g., enterprise platforms, mobile phones, PCs,…

We survey the landscape of human operator modeling ranging from the early cognitive models developed in artificial intelligence to more recent formal task models developed for model-checking of human machine interactions. We review human…

Todays industrial control systems consist of tightly coupled components allowing adversaries to exploit security attack surfaces from the information technology side, and, thus, also get access to automation devices residing at the…

We present a safety verification framework for design-time and run-time assurance of learning-based components in aviation systems. Our proposed framework integrates two novel methodologies. From the design-time assurance perspective, we…

This research paper presents an approach to enhancing the predictive capability of architects in the design and assurance of systems, focusing on systems operating in dynamic and unpredictable environments. By adopting a systems approach,…

Many wireless communications systems found in aircraft lack standard security mechanisms, leaving them fundamentally vulnerable to attack. With affordable software-defined radios available, a novel threat has emerged, allowing a wide range…

While explicit Chain-of-Thought (CoT) empowers large reasoning models (LRMs), it enables the generation of riskier final answers. Current alignment paradigms primarily rely on externally enforced compliance, optimizing models to detect…

Internet browsers use security protocols to protect sensitive messages. An inductive analysis of TLS (a descendant of SSL 3.0) has been performed using the theorem prover Isabelle. Proofs are based on higher-order logic and make no…

The failure of hardware or software in a critical system can lead to loss of lives. The design errors can be main source of the failures that can be introduced during system development process. Formal techniques are an alternative approach…

In this paper, we present a proof theory for attack trees. Attack trees are a well established and useful model for the construction of attacks on systems since they allow a stepwise exploration of high level attacks in application…

In this paper, we introduce a process of formal system development supported by interactive theorem proving in a dedicated Isabelle framework. This Isabelle Infrastructure framework implements specification and verification in a cyclic…

In this paper we present an efficient approach to implementing model checking in the Higher Order Logic (HOL) of Isabelle. This is a non-trivial task since model checking is restricted to finite state sets. By restricting our scope to…

Industrial inspection automation in aerospace presents numerous challenges due to the dynamic, information-rich and regulated aspects of the domain. To diagnose the condition of an aircraft component, expert inspectors rely on a significant…

The severity of recent vulnerabilities discovered on modern CPUs, e.g., Spectre [1], highlights how information leakage can have devas-tating effects to the security of computer systems. At the same time, it suggests that confidentiality…

In this paper, we show a security engineering process based on a formal notion of refinement fully formalized in the proof assistant Isabelle. This Refinement-Risk Cycle focuses on attack analysis and security refinement supported by…

Assurance cases are often required as a means to certify a critical system. Use of formal methods in assurance can improve automation, and overcome problems with ambiguity, faulty reasoning, and inadequate evidentiary support. However,…

Assurance cases are often required to certify critical systems. The use of formal methods in assurance can improve automation, increase confidence, and overcome errant reasoning. However, assurance cases can never be fully formalised, as…