相关论文: Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Non-linear Utili…

We consider a hidden-action principal-agent model, in which actions require different amounts of effort, and the agent privately knows his ability that determines his cost of effort. We show that linear contracts admit approximation…

We consider the problem of linear regression from strategic data sources with a public good component, i.e., when data is provided by strategic agents who seek to minimize an individual provision cost for increasing their data's precision…

Agent-based modelling is a powerful tool when simulating human systems, yet when human behaviour cannot be described by simple rules or maximising one's own profit, we quickly reach the limits of this methodology. Machine learning has the…

This paper analyzes the global dynamics of 1-dimensional agent arrays with nearest neighbor linear couplings. The equations of motion are second order linear ODEs with constant coeffcients. The novel part of this research is that the…

We study two stylized, multi-agent models aimed at investing a limited, indivisible resource in public transportation. In the first model, we face the decision of which potential stops to open along a (e.g., bus) path, given agents' travel…

This paper presents a simple agent-based model of an economic system, populated by agents playing different games according to their different view about social cohesion and tax payment. After a first set of simulations, correctly…

In the Seat Arrangement problem the goal is to allocate agents to vertices in a graph such that the resulting arrangement is optimal or fair in some way. Examples include an arrangement that maximises utility or one where no agent envies…

This paper studies a one-sector optimal growth model with i.i.d. productivity shocks that are allowed to be unbounded. The utility function is assumed to be non-negative and unbounded from above. The novel feature in our framework is that…

In various economic environments, people observe other people with whom they strategically interact. We can model such information-sharing relations as an information network, and the strategic interactions as a game on the network. When…

With recent development of artificial intelligence, it is more common to adopt AI agents in economic activities. This paper explores the economic actions of agents, including human agents and AI agents, in an economic game of trading…

We study non-monetary mechanisms for the fair and efficient allocation of reusable public resources, i.e., resources used for varying durations. We consider settings where a limited resource is repeatedly shared among a set of agents, each…

We present an overview of some representative Agent-Based Models in Economics. We discuss why and how agent-based models represent an important step in order to explain the dynamics and the statistical properties of financial markets beyond…

We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, for instance, in procurement auctions for energy). We provide…

In practice, most mechanisms for selling, buying, matching, voting, and so on are not incentive compatible. We present techniques for estimating how far a mechanism is from incentive compatible. Given samples from the agents' type…

We formalize three design axioms for sustained adoption of agent-centric AI systems executing multi-step tasks: (A1) Reliability > Novelty; (A2) Embed > Destination; (A3) Agency > Chat. We model adoption as a sum of a decaying novelty term…

This work gives the first natural non-utilitarian problems for which the trivial $n$ approximation via VCG mechanisms is the best possible. That is, no truthful mechanism can be better than $n$ approximate, where $n$ is the number of…

We study the fair allocation of indivisible items to $n$ agents to maximize the utilitarian social welfare, where the fairness criterion is envy-free up to one item and there are only two different utility functions shared by the agents. We…

The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents is a classic research direction, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games as prominent examples. In these games, agents select available resources and their utility then…

For the last two decades, high-dimensional data and methods have proliferated throughout the literature. Yet, the classical technique of linear regression has not lost its usefulness in applications. In fact, many high-dimensional…

We derive the revenue-optimal efficient (welfare-maximizing) mechanism in a general multidimensional mechanism design setting when type spaces -- that is, the underlying domains from which agents' values come from -- can capture arbitrarily…