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We propose DIPS Difficulty-based Incentives for Problem Solving), a simple modification of the Bitcoin proof-of-work algorithm that rewards blockchain miners for solving optimization problems of scientific interest. The result is a…

分布式、并行与集群计算 · 计算机科学 2022-06-03 Pericles Philippopoulos , Alessandro Ricottone , Carlos G. Oliver

Proof of work (PoW), the most popular consensus mechanism for Blockchain, requires ridiculously large amounts of energy but without any useful outcome beyond determining accounting rights among miners. To tackle the drawback of PoW, we…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2019-12-30 Xidi Qu , Shengling Wang , Qin Hu , Xiuzhen Cheng

Mining pools, the main components of the Bitcoin network, dominate the computing resources and play essential roles in network security and performance aspects. Although many existing measurements of the Bitcoin network are available,…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2019-02-22 Canhui Wang , Xiaowen Chu , Qin Yang

Blockchain systems often employ proof-of-work consensus protocols to validate and add transactions into hashchains. These protocols stimulate competition among miners in solving cryptopuzzles (e.g. SHA-256 hash computation in Bitcoin) in…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2020-05-13 Venkata Sriram Siddhardh Nadendla , Lav R. Varshney

Sharding enhances blockchain scalability by dividing the network into shards, each managing specific unspent transaction outputs or accounts. As an introduced new transaction type, cross-shard transactions pose a critical challenge to the…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2024-09-13 Yizhong Liu , Andi Liu , Yuan Lu , Zhuocheng Pan , Yinuo Li , Jianwei Liu , Song Bian , Mauro Conti

We study the strategic implications that arise from adding one extra option to the miners participating in the bitcoin protocol. We propose that when adding a block, miners also have the ability to pay forward an amount to be collected by…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2019-05-21 Elias Koutsoupias , Philip Lazos , Paolo Serafino , Foluso Ogunlana

As cryptographic tokens and altcoins are increasingly being built to serve as utility tokens, the notion of useful work consensus protocols, as opposed to number-crunching PoW consensus, is becoming ever more important. In such contexts,…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2019-05-13 Michał Król , Alberto Sonnino , Mustafa Al-Bassam , Argyrios Tasiopoulos , Ioannis Psaras

Proof-of-Work (PoW) is a popular consensus protocol used by Bitcoin since its inception. PoW has the well-known flaw of assigning all the reward to the single miner (or pool) that inserts the new block. This has the consequence of making…

分布式、并行与集群计算 · 计算机科学 2022-07-13 Danilo Bazzanella , Andrea Gangemi

Mining in proof-of-work blockchains has become an expensive affair requiring specialized hardware capable of executing several megahashes per second at huge electricity costs. Miners earn a reward each time they mine a block within the…

网络与互联网体系结构 · 计算机科学 2023-08-30 Arti Vedula , Abhishek Gupta , Shaileshh Bojja Venkatakrishnan

Proof of Stake (PoS) blockchains offer promising alternatives to traditional Proof of Work (PoW) systems, providing scalability and energy efficiency. However, blockchains operate in a decentralized manner and the network is composed of…

分布式、并行与集群计算 · 计算机科学 2025-04-25 Faisal Haque Bappy , Tariqul Islam , Kamrul Hasan , Md Sajidul Islam Sajid , Mir Mehedi Ahsan Pritom

Temporary fork is a fundamental phenomenon in many blockchains with proof of work, and the analysis of temporary fork has recently drawn great attention. Different from existing efforts that focus on the blockchain system factors such as…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2020-11-17 Canhui Chen , Xu Chen , Jiangshan Yu , Weigang Wu , Di Wu

Consensus protocols used today in blockchains often rely on computational power or financial stakes - scarce resources. We propose a novel protocol using social capital - trust and influence from social interactions - as a non-transferable…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2025-11-06 Juraj Mariani , Ivan Homoliak

Blockchains rely on economic incentives to ensure secure and decentralised operation, making incentive compatibility a core design concern. However, protocols are rarely deployed in isolation. Applications interact with the underlying…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2026-04-08 Zeta Avarikioti , Georg Fuchsbauer , Pim Keer , Matteo Maffei , Fabian Regen

As the core technology behind Bitcoin, Blockchain's decentralized, tamper-proof, and traceable features make it the preferred platform for organizational innovation. In current Bitcoin, block reward is halved every four years, and…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2022-02-22 Xiongfei Zhao , Yain-Whar Si

The core of many cryptocurrencies is the decentralised validation network operating on proof-of-work technology. In these systems, validation is done by so-called miners who can digitally sign blocks once they solve a computationally-hard…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2023-05-04 Sheng-Nan Li , Carlo Campajola , Claudio J. Tessone

Given the large adoption and economical impact of permissionless blockchains, the complexity of the underlying systems and the adversarial environment in which they operate, it is fundamental to properly study and understand the emergent…

分布式、并行与集群计算 · 计算机科学 2023-05-22 Paulo Silva , David Vavřička , João Barreto , Miguel Matos

We study the incentives behind double-spend attacks on Nakamoto-style Proof-of-Work cryptocurrencies. In these systems, miners are allowed to choose which transactions to reference with their block, and a common strategy for selecting…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-12-14 Yanni Georghiades , Rajesh Mishra , Karl Kreder , Sriram Vishwanath

Blockchain technology has been gaining great interest from a variety of sectors, including healthcare, supply chain and cryptocurrencies. However, Blockchain suffers from its limited ability to scale (i.e. low throughput and high latency).…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2021-08-13 Abdelatif Hafid , Abdelhakim Senhaji Hafid , Adil Senhaji

Selfish miners selectively withhold blocks to earn disproportionately high revenue. The vast majority of the selfish mining literature focuses exclusively on block rewards. Carlsten et al. [2016] is a notable exception, observing that…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-08-11 Maryam Bahrani , Michael Neuder , S. Matthew Weinberg

This paper introduces a game-theoretic model tailored for reward distribution on crowd-sourced computing platforms. It explores a repeated game framework where miners, as computation providers, decide their computation power contribution in…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-04-11 Shuhao Zheng , Ziyue Xin , Zonglun Li , Xue Liu