相关论文: Socio-network Analysis of RTL Designs for Hardware…

Trojans are one of the most threatening network attacks currently. HTTP-based Trojan, in particular, accounts for a considerable proportion of them. Moreover, as the network environment becomes more complex, HTTP-based Trojan is more…

This paper utilizes Reinforcement Learning (RL) as a means to automate the Hardware Trojan (HT) insertion process to eliminate the inherent human biases that limit the development of robust HT detection methods. An RL agent explores the…

Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications in digital designs that can be inserted by untrusted supply chain entities. Hardware Trojans can give rise to diverse attack vectors such as information leakage (e.g. MOLES Trojan) and…

Hardware Trojans (HTs) have become a serious problem, and extermination of them is strongly required for enhancing the security and safety of integrated circuits. An effective solution is to identify HTs at the gate level via machine…

Semiconductor design houses are increasingly becoming dependent on third party vendors to procure intellectual property (IP) and meet time-to-market constraints. However, these third party IPs cannot be trusted as hardware Trojans can be…

The use of third-party IP cores in implementing applications in FPGAs has given rise to the threat of malicious alterations through the insertion of hardware Trojans. To address this threat, it is important to predict the way hardware…

The globalization of the Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain has moved most of the design, fabrication, and testing process from a single trusted entity to various untrusted third-party entities worldwide. The risk of using untrusted…

Hardware trojans are malicious circuits which compromise the functionality and security of an integrated circuit (IC). These circuits are manufactured directly into the silicon and cannot be fixed by security patches like software. The…

Software-exploitable Hardware Trojans (HTs) enable attackers to execute unauthorized software or gain illicit access to privileged operations. This manuscript introduces a hardware-based methodology for detecting runtime HT activations…

The growing use of third-party hardware accelerators (e.g., FPGAs, ASICs) for deep neural networks (DNNs) introduces new security vulnerabilities. Conventional model-level backdoor attacks, which only poison a model's weights to misclassify…

Hardware Trojans (HTs) remain a critical threat because learning-based detectors often overfit to narrow trigger/payload patterns and small, stylized benchmarks. We introduce TrojanGYM, an agentic, LLM-driven framework that automatically…

A major security threat to an integrated circuit (IC) design is the Hardware Trojan attack which is a malicious modification of the design. Previously several papers have investigated into side-channel analysis to detect the presence of…

Third-party intellectual property cores are essential building blocks of modern system-on-chip and integrated circuit designs. However, these design components usually come from vendors of different trust levels and may contain undocumented…

Conventional Hardware Trojan (HT) detection techniques are based on the validation of integrated circuits to determine changes in their functionality, and on non-invasive side-channel analysis to identify the variations in their physical…

Various logic-locking schemes have been proposed to protect hardware from intellectual property piracy and malicious design modifications. Since traditional locking techniques are applied on the gate-level netlist after logic synthesis,…

This work focuses on advancing security research in the hardware design space by formally defining the realistic problem of Hardware Trojan (HT) detection. The goal is to model HT detection more closely to the real world, i.e., describing…

Many fabless semiconductor companies outsource their designs to third-party fabrication houses. As trustworthiness of chain after outsourcing including fabrication houses is not established, any adversary in between, with malicious intent…

Insertion of hardware Trojans (HTs) in integrated circuits is a pernicious threat. Since HTs are activated under rare trigger conditions, detecting them using random logic simulations is infeasible. In this work, we design a reinforcement…

There are increasing concerns about possible malicious modifications of integrated circuits (ICs) used in critical applications. Such attacks are often referred to as hardware Trojans. While many techniques focus on hardware Trojan…

Traditional learning-based approaches for run-time Hardware Trojan detection require complex and expensive on-chip data acquisition frameworks and thus incur high area and power overhead. To address these challenges, we propose to leverage…