相关论文: Anchoring Theory in Sequential Stackelberg Games

We study the behavioral implications of Rationality and Common Strong Belief in Rationality (RCSBR) with contextual assumptions allowing players to entertain misaligned beliefs, i.e., players can hold beliefs concerning their opponents'…

Reinforcement learning (RL) has recently proven effective at scaling chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning in large language models for tasks with verifiable answers. However, extending RL-based thought training to more general non-verifiable…

We introduce and study a new model of interactive proofs: AM(k), or Arthur-Merlin with k non-communicating Merlins. Unlike with the better-known MIP, here the assumption is that each Merlin receives an independent random challenge from…

Asymmetric information stochastic games (AISGs) arise in many complex socio-technical systems, such as cyber-physical systems and IT infrastructures. Existing computational methods for AISGs are primarily offline and can not adapt to…

We consider a one-round two-player network pricing game, the Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree game or StackMST. The game is played on a graph (representing a network), whose edges are colored either red or blue, and where the red edges…

The present survey aims at presenting the current machine learning techniques employed in security games domains. Specifically, we focused on papers and works developed by the Teamcore of University of Southern California, which deepened…

Equilibrium refinements are important in extensive-form (i.e., tree-form) games, where they amend weaknesses of the Nash equilibrium concept by requiring sequential rationality and other beneficial properties. One of the most attractive…

The paper [Ras15a] introduced distribution-valued games. This game-theoretic model uses probability distributions as payoffs for games in order to express uncertainty about the payoffs. The player's preferences for different payoffs are…

We consider game-theoretically secure distributed protocols for coalition games that approximate the Shapley value with small multiplicative error. Since all known existing approximation algorithms for the Shapley value are randomized, it…

We study payoff manipulation in repeated multi-objective Stackelberg games, where a leader may strategically influence a follower's deterministic best response, e.g., by offering a share of their own payoff. We assume that the follower's…

A growing body of work in game theory extends the traditional Stackelberg game to settings with one leader and multiple followers who play a Nash equilibrium. Standard approaches for computing equilibria in these games reformulate the…

In recent years, Signal Temporal Logic (STL) has gained traction as a practical and expressive means of encoding control objectives for robotic and cyber-physical systems. The state-of-the-art in STL trajectory synthesis is to formulate the…

TheMinority Game (MG) has become a paradigm to probe complex social and economical phenomena where adaptive agents compete for a limited resource, and it finds applications in statistical and nonlinear physics as well. In the traditional MG…

The takeoff point for this paper is the voluminous body of literature addressing recursive betting games with expected logarithmic growth of wealth being the performance criterion. Whereas almost all existing papers involve use of linear…

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning with self-consistency improves performance by aggregating multiple sampled reasoning paths. In this setting, correctness is no longer tied to a single reasoning trace but to the aggregation rule over a pool…

This paper addresses a Stackelberg stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ) differential game under closed-loop information, a problem inherently time-inconsistent. Existing approaches rely on solving two coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)…

Driven by recent successes in two-player, zero-sum game solving and playing, artificial intelligence work on games has increasingly focused on algorithms that produce equilibrium-based strategies. However, this approach has been less…

We present a robust framework with computational algorithms to support decision makers in sequential games. Our framework includes methods to solve games with complete information, assess the robustness of such solutions and, finally,…

We propose a sequential optimizing betting strategy in the multi-dimensional bounded forecasting game in the framework of game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk (2001). By studying the asymptotic behavior of its capital process, we…

We consider multi-armed bandit problems in social groups wherein each individual has bounded memory and shares the common goal of learning the best arm/option. We say an individual learns the best option if eventually (as $t\to \infty$) it…