相关论文: An Off-Chip Attack on Hardware Enclaves via the Me…

In this paper, we explore a new, yet critical, side-channel attack against Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX), called a branch shadowing attack, which can reveal fine-grained control flows (i.e., each branch) of an enclave program running…

Users' website browsing history contains sensitive information, like health conditions, political interests, financial situations, etc. Some recent studies have demonstrated the possibility of inferring website fingerprints based on…

Electromagnetic fault injection (EMFI) is a well known technique used to disturb the behaviour of a chip for weakening its security. These attacks are mostly done on simple microcontrollers. On these targets, the fault effects are…

Over the past years, literature has shown that attacks exploiting the microarchitecture of modern processors pose a serious threat to the privacy of mobile phone users. This is because applications leave distinct footprints in the…

RowHammer is a vulnerability inside DRAM chips where an attacker repeatedly accesses a DRAM row to flip bits in the nearby rows without directly accessing them. Several studies have found that flipping bits in the address part inside a page…

In the last 10 years, cache attacks on Intel x86 CPUs have gained increasing attention among the scientific community and powerful techniques to exploit cache side channels have been developed. However, modern smartphones use one or more…

The hardware/software boundary in modern heterogeneous multicore computers is increasingly complex, and diverse across different platforms. A single memory access by a core or DMA engine traverses multiple hardware translation and caching…

Reading or writing outside the bounds of a buffer is a serious security vulnerability that has been exploited in numerous occasions. These attacks can be prevented by ensuring that every buffer is only accessed within its specified bounds.…

Covert channel attacks have been continuously studied as severe threats to modern computing systems. Software-based covert channels are a typically hard-to-detect branch of these attacks, since they leverage virtual resources to establish…

Hardware-enclaves that target complex CPU designs compromise both security and performance. Programs have little control over micro-architecture, which leads to side-channel leaks, and then have to be transformed to have worst-case control-…

While disk encryption is suitable for use in most situations where confidentiality of disks is required, stronger guarantees are required in situations where adversaries may employ coercive tactics to gain access to cryptographic keys.…

Both AMD and Intel have presented technologies for confidential computing in cloud environments. The proposed solutions - AMD SEV (-ES, -SNP) and Intel TDX - protect Virtual Machines (VMs) against attacks from higher privileged layers…

With the increasing reliance of smart grids on correctly functioning SCADA systems and their vulnerability to cyberattacks, there is a pressing need for effective security measures. SCADA systems are prone to cyberattacks, posing risks to…

CMOS one-time-programmable (OTP) memories based on antifuses are widely used for storing small amounts of data (such as serial numbers, keys, and factory trimming) in integrated circuits due to their low cost, requiring no additional mask…

The use of trusted hardware has become a promising solution to enable privacy-preserving machine learning. In particular, users can upload their private data and models to a hardware-enforced trusted execution environment (e.g. an enclave…

Intel SGX enables memory isolation and static integrity verification of code and data stored in user-space memory regions called enclaves. SGX effectively shields the execution of enclaves from the underlying untrusted OS. Attackers cannot…

Cloud providers are extending support for trusted hardware primitives such as Intel SGX. Simultaneously, the field of deep learning is seeing enormous innovation as well as an increase in adoption. In this paper, we ask a timely question:…

The adversarial model presented by trusted execution environments (TEEs) has prompted researchers to investigate unusual attack vectors. One particularly powerful class of controlled-channel attacks abuses page-table modifications to…

In this paper, we investigate how attackers can discover sensitive information embedded within databases by exploiting inference rules. We demonstrate the inadequacy of naively applied existing state of the art differential privacy (DP)…

A fundamental assumption in software security is that a memory location can only be modified by processes that may write to this memory location. However, a recent study has shown that parasitic effects in DRAM can change the content of a…