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相关论文: Deception through Half-Truths

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We develop and study new adversarial perturbations that enable an attacker to gain control over decisions in generic Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems including deep learning neural networks. In contrast to adversarial data modification,…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2023-12-07 Ivan Y. Tyukin , Desmond J. Higham , Alexander Bastounis , Eliyas Woldegeorgis , Alexander N. Gorban

Pseudo-Labeling is a simple and effective approach to semi-supervised learning. It requires criteria that guide the selection of pseudo-labeled data. The latter have been shown to crucially affect pseudo-labeling's generalization…

机器学习 · 计算机科学 2023-09-27 Julian Rodemann

Automatic unreliable news detection is a research problem with great potential impact. Recently, several papers have shown promising results on large-scale news datasets with models that only use the article itself without resorting to any…

计算与语言 · 计算机科学 2021-04-21 Xiang Zhou , Heba Elfardy , Christos Christodoulopoulos , Thomas Butler , Mohit Bansal

We study a social learning model in which agents iteratively update their beliefs about the true state of the world using private signals and the beliefs of other agents in a non-Bayesian manner. Some agents are stubborn, meaning they…

社会与信息网络 · 计算机科学 2022-09-21 Daniel Vial , Vijay Subramanian

A new era of Information Warfare has arrived. Various actors, including state-sponsored ones, are weaponizing information on Online Social Networks to run false information campaigns with targeted manipulation of public opinion on specific…

社会与信息网络 · 计算机科学 2019-07-22 Savvas Zannettou , Michael Sirivianos , Jeremy Blackburn , Nicolas Kourtellis

We study a full implementation problem with a state unknown to the designer but known to agents, where agents have uncertain evidence privately drawn from state-dependent distributions. Stochastic evidence enables ``perfect deceptions,''…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2025-08-07 Soumen Banerjee , Yi-Chun Chen

Deception plays a crucial role in strategic interactions with incomplete information. Motivated by security applications, we study a class of two-player turn-based deterministic games with one-sided incomplete information, in which player 1…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-07-22 Abhishek N. Kulkarni , Matthew S. Cohen , Charles A. Kamhoua , Jie Fu

In this paper, we study axiomatic foundations of Bayesian persuasion, where a principal (i.e., sender) delegates the task of choice making after informing a biased agent (i.e., receiver) about the payoff relevant uncertain state (see, e.g.,…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2025-12-30 Youichiro Higashi , Kemal Ozbek , Norio Takeoka

We introduce a stochastic principal-agent model. A principal and an agent interact in a stochastic environment, each privy to observations about the state not available to the other. The principal has the power of commitment, both to elicit…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-09-13 Jiarui Gan , Rupak Majumdar , Debmalya Mandal , Goran Radanovic

Online information ecosystems are now central to our everyday social interactions. Of the many opportunities and challenges this presents, the capacity for artificial agents to shape individual and collective human decision-making in such…

种群与进化 · 定量生物学 2023-12-07 Theodor Cimpeanu , Alexander J. Stewart

We focus on the scenario in which an agent can exploit his information advantage to manipulate the outcome of an election. In particular, we study district-based elections with two candidates, in which the winner of the election is the…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2020-12-11 Matteo Castiglioni , Nicola Gatti

This paper studies delegation in a model of discrete choice. In the delegation problem, an uninformed principal must consult an informed agent to make a decision. Both the agent and principal have preferences over the decided-upon action…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-06-25 Ali Khodabakhsh , Emmanouil Pountourakis , Samuel Taggart

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the online Bayesian persuasion framework, in which the sender…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-03-03 Martino Bernasconi , Matteo Castiglioni , Andrea Celli , Alberto Marchesi , Nicola Gatti , Francesco Trovò

This work studies the learning process over social networks under partial and random information sharing. In traditional social learning models, agents exchange full belief information with each other while trying to infer the true state of…

信号处理 · 电气工程与系统科学 2023-12-27 Mert Kayaalp , Virginia Bordignon , Ali H. Sayed

Cyber deception aims to distract, delay, and detect network attackers with fake assets such as honeypots, decoy credentials, or decoy files. However, today, it is difficult for operators to experiment, explore, and evaluate deception…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2025-09-29 Brian Singer , Yusuf Saquib , Lujo Bauer , Vyas Sekar

After experimenting with a number of non-probabilistic methods for dealing with uncertainty many researchers reaffirm a preference for probability methods [1] [2], although this remains controversial. The importance of being able to form…

人工智能 · 计算机科学 2013-04-11 Thomas Slack

The present level of proliferation of fake, biased, and propagandistic content online has made it impossible to fact-check every single suspicious claim or article, either manually or automatically. Thus, many researchers are shifting their…

社会与信息网络 · 计算机科学 2021-03-24 Preslav Nakov , Husrev Taha Sencar , Jisun An , Haewoon Kwak

Fake news is a type of pervasive propaganda that spreads misinformation online, taking advantage of social media's extensive reach to manipulate public perception. Over the past three years, fake news has become a focal discussion point in…

计算与语言 · 计算机科学 2019-10-08 Qi Jia Sun

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. Classical models make the stringent assumption that the sender knows the receiver's utility.…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2021-06-14 Matteo Castiglioni , Alberto Marchesi , Andrea Celli , Nicola Gatti

We show that in delegation problems, a principal benefits from belief misalignment vis-\`a-vis an agent when the latter can flexibly acquire costly information. The agent optimally succumbs to confirmatory learning, leading him to favor the…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2025-07-30 Pavel Ilinov , Andrei Matveenko , Maxim Senkov , Egor Starkov